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Introduction
The struggle of women against constraints placed upon them because of gender is one
historically shared worldwide and continues today. In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term
“intersectional feminism” to describe how intersections of oppression impact women to varying
degrees and argued that the goal of feminism must be to challenge these intersections. To not
challenge these intersections is to, instead, reproduce them. Crenshaw demonstrates that the
failure of American feminism to adequately interrogate the problems of racism caused feminism
in the US to replicate and reinforce the racism women of color faced. Likewise, civil rights
movements to end racism largely ignored the oppression of women by patriarchy and, in so
doing, reproduced the subordination of women. The conclusion is that oppression cannot be
examined separately; and that, to achieve gender justice, women must actively work towards
justice for all.1
Similarly, the historic choice by international women’s organizations to ignore global
intersections caused them to reproduce global oppression. For example, the International
Women’s Suffrage Association (IWSA) sent two delegates to Egypt between 1911 and 1912.2
The objective of the IWSA was to raise international sisterhood in the fight for women’s
democratic rights. Laura Bier points out that the IWSA initially based its premise for
international solidarity among women on biology “and a common experience of exclusion based
on that biology”.3 This basis of sisterhood gave the IWSA the ability to forge sisterhood while
simultaneously giving them the impetus to ignore conditions of oppression which could not be
1
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universally shared. Thus, though the IWSA wanted to help Egyptian women establish a suffrage
association to affiliate with the international branch, its European leaders were unprepared to
confront the realities of colonization. How could European women forge international sisterhood
on the grounds of women’s suffrage with women from states where even men lacked political
enfranchisement? It was an uncomfortable question that Western women chose to leave
unanswered out of political expediency. After all, challenging the colonial legacy of their
governments put them at risk of losing support at home.
Chandra Mohanty points out that women of the non-Western hegemonic world have
forged a sisterhood through their common interactions with Western imperialism. Its basis is a
shared “opposition to forms of domination that are not only pervasive but systematic.”4 It is the
oppressions which emerged out of the world order through global processes such as colonization
and the spread of capitalism that have shaped female identities in the so-called “Second” and
“Third World.” These terms are used as shorthand, because Mohanty explains that the very idea
that there exists a monolithic “Second” or “Third World” is perpetuated by the exploitative
structures of the Euro-American capitalist world order. The only shared fact among the countries
commonly accepted as belonging to these worlds is a “common context of struggle” against the
powers who exploit them and whose very language works to preserve this exploitation. Thus, to
create a genuine, worldwide sisterhood, it is imperative for women who belong to these powers
to examine how the forces of the patriarchal world order have shaped oppression faced by
women of the “Second” and “Third Worlds.”
Feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith argues that power, above all else, defines gender
inequality. She describes power as “relations of the ruling” and defines it as “a concept that
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grasps power, organization, direction, and regulation [that is] more pervasively structured than
can be expressed in traditional concepts provided by the discourses on power.”5 Relations of the
ruling are wielded in systems and social processes—in law and government, bureaucracies and
administrations, in professional organizations and media, but also in the production of thought
and ideas, in discourse and identity. Oppression assumes different shapes in different places
because of variations in these widescale systems and processes. Smith posits that, therefore,
understanding these processes is intrinsic to ending oppression in all forms.
Smith’s theory will provide the framework for this examination. While such an
examination could be applied to any region or state of what has been deemed the “Second” and
“Third World” by the Euro-American hegemonic bloc, the scope of this examination has been
confined to Egypt for multiple reasons. First, most emblematic of the separation caused by
unexamined intersections is Middle Eastern women. Middle Eastern women have been at the
apex of political discourse on the Middle East and Islam with many Westerners pointing to the
maltreatment of women in the region on the basis of gender, to justify the maltreatment of those
same women on the basis of nationality and religion. This is extremely problematic for feminism
and requires rectification. Second, Egypt makes a perfect case for examination of this global
intersection Middle Eastern women face, because Egypt’s historical struggle against the colonial
and post-colonial global orders is rich, while Egypt’s history of feminist struggle against both the
internal patriarchy and external colonizers is richer still.6
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To examine how colonialism and its neocolonial predecessors have influenced women’s
oppression in Egypt, a historical reading to illustrate how colonialism influenced the
development of Egypt’s systems of power and social processes, and how those systems and
processes oppressed Egyptian women is necessary. Then, a historical examination of how
Egyptian women organized to fight these systems and processes will be provided to illustrate the
ways in which Egyptian feminist work can be integrated into Western feminist politics. This
reading will move linearly through history beginning with Egypt’s initial interactions with the
colonial world order under Pasha Muhammad ‘Ali and the entrance of Egypt into British
colonization following the establishment of the Public Debt Commission. Then, the reading will
examine the advent of state feminism after the 1952 revolution under Gamal Abdel Nasser and
an investigation into the ways in which Nasser’s government was a response to both Egypt’s
historical struggle against colonialism and the emergence of Cold War politics. Finally, the
transformation of Egypt under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak and the complicity of capitalism
in exploiting their alacrity for unreserved violence will be explored into present day following
the 2011 Arab Spring. However, it is first necessary to decondition the prejudices and
assumptions Westerners have been embedded with regarding women in the Middle East.
Demarginalizing Women in the Middle East
To seriously address the intersections our sisters of the Middle East face, it is of the
utmost importance to reject the idea that the oppression women face in the Middle East is unique
and that it’s produced by Islam or Middle Eastern culture. While Islam has often been invoked to
rationalize women’s subjugation, many Middle Eastern feminists in fact derive their feminism

Family: The Reformulation of Hudud in Egypt and Tunisia” in From Patriarchy to Empowerment ed. Moghadam,
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from their Islamic faiths.7 In fact, one of the first Egyptian women elected to their parliament in
1957, Rawya Attiya, commented that she convinced her constituents to vote for her by reminding
voters “of the Prophet’s wives and families until they changed their opinions.”8
Therefore, such an examination must also reject the sensationalism of Muslim and
Middle Eastern women that is often perpetuated by the Western gaze. For this reason, this work
abdicates analysis of women’s issues in Islam. For example, it specifically rejects debating the
contention of female veiling. While two of Egypt’s early feminists, Huda Sha’rawi and Saiza
Nabarawi, are famous for publicly removing their hijabs at a train station in Cairo,9 the matter of
veiling is one that ought to be left to the individual feminist. South African-Indian-Muslim
author Sa’diyya Shaikh admits that the hijab is forced by law on some Muslim women, such as
“Afghani women under Taliban rule.”10 However, the majority of Muslim women around the
world don’t live under such circumstances. Shaikh points out that, for some Muslim feminists,
wearing the hijab is a political act in protest of “patriarchal prioritization of women’s physical
and sexual attractiveness.”11 In a world where men feel entitled to openly harass women on the
streets, for some the hijab reclaims the female body from the male gaze.
Furthermore, the matter of veiling and the so-called “treatment of women by Islam” have
time and again been used as justifications to advance imperialist interests. It was used as a
justification for the colonization of Egypt by the British Consul General of Egypt, Lord Cromer,
who proposed that colonization could liberate Egyptian women, yet simultaneously opposed
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women’s suffrage in his home country.12 It was repeated by George W. Bush as a rationalization
for going to war in Iraq.13 The treatment of women has even been weaponized as it’s been
established as “an obstacle to international security and, implicitly, a basis for international
intervention” through UN Security Council Resolution 1899.14 The matter of female subjugation
is political. Narratives lamenting the treatment of Muslim women, while at once suggesting
domination of any kind to be the remedy, are a work of these politics. For this reason, this work
takes due diligence in not replicating the hegemony of Western cultural ideals on Egyptian
feminists. Therefore, the matter of veiling by Egyptian women is left without further discussion.
The treatment of women in Islam has been portrayed as uniquely oppressive and dangerous by
Western discourse and has provided those who would guise themselves as feminists the impetus
to largely ignore female voices that run counter to these portrayals.
The suggestion that the oppression of such an enormous population of women can be
separated others is dangerous to all. Women around the world have faced oppression since the
dawn of civilization. All of women’s grievances are connected and it’s of the utmost importance
for women to recognize how their various oppressions influence and affect one another. The
Western sensationalism of the treatment of women by Islam and Middle Eastern culture,
suggests that cases of gendered oppression are due to the cultural traditions and beliefs of the
Middle East. This simultaneously infers that oppression faced by women in the West was
somehow less abusive than that faced by women of the Middle East, because the oppression of
Shaikh, “Transforming Feminisms,” 150.
George W. Bush’s exploitation of women and feminism in justifying the war in Iraq is well documented. For
more, see: Cloud, D. L. 2004. “To Veil the Threat of Terror: Afghan Women and the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ in the
Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. 90 (3): 285–306; Riley, R. L., C. T. Mohanty,
and M. B. Pratt, eds. 2008. Feminism and War: Confronting US Imperialism. London: Zed; Enloe, C. 2010. Nimo’s
War, Emma’s War: Making Feminist Sense of The Iraq War. Berkeley: California University Press; or Pratt, Nicola.
"Weaponising Feminism for the “war on Terror”, versus Employing Strategic Silence." Critical Studies on
Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013): 327-31.
14 Pratt, Nicola. "Weaponising Feminism for the “war on Terror”, versus Employing Strategic Silence." Critical
Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013): 329.
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women in the West wasn’t tied to cultural tradition or beliefs. This suggestion allows the erasure
of women’s rights as a victory of women and women’s movements and, instead, claims it as a
victory of the very powers which women’s rights were won against.
The idea that the oppression of women in the West is not as abusive or as embedded into
our culture as the oppression of women from other cultures is a tool systematically used by
patriarchists to separate women from each other. Women need each other. Patriarchal
governments wrote history, they created a world in which the domination, exploitation, and
genocide of people around the world was a divine right of power. Patriarchal structures created a
global hierarchy, in which no matter what ring of the ladder one falls under—whether that’s
white, black, Mexican, Christian, Muslim, Second World, Third World—women always fall to
the bottom of their bracket. It is the object of feminism to undo all that patriarchy has done, not
to replicate its hierarchal structures, but to create a new structure based on justice, equality, and
inclusiveness.
In reality, women of the Ottoman Empire experienced far greater equality than Western
women of the time both economically and legally. Early Western literature written by men who
stayed with the Ottoman family described the segregation of imperial women within the harem.15
These writers often described the female harem as a den of slave concubines present only for the
many fetishes of the sultan. What these men failed to recognize, and what other scholars like
Professor Leslie P. Pierce have since corrected, is that the harem did not dichotomize Ottoman
society into a gendered domain of living, but rather into a class-system.16
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The highly privileged were secluded in private from the common spaces of the public.
Women and men of the imperial harem both traveled with dense entourages and bodyguards
whenever they traveled outside of the harem, usually for public events such as parades. In the
public spaces, women and men were very much integrated as could be observed at market
bazaars, where working class women and men sold their wares and mingled in the streets. Put
simply, the harem was a matter of socioeconomic condition. Furthermore, the female imperial
harem was made up of not only concubines, but female relatives of the sultan such as princess
daughters, sisters, and queen mothers, but also midwives, administrators, tutors, and servants.17
A unique examination of the experience of imperial women’s seclusion in the harem was
offered by British Lady Mary Wortley Montagu who stayed with the women’s imperial harem.
In letters that were later published as a book, Lady Montagu depicts a far different illustration
than that of her male counterparts who stayed with the male imperial harem and imagined the
female harem as a brothel. Lady Montagu wrote that the women of the imperial harem were
provided excellent education, comfort, and leisure. They learned to play and write music,
arithmetic, and to speak foreign languages. Lady Montagu remarked that the women of the
imperial harem were the freest women in the Ottoman Empire, and even added that they were
“perhaps freer than any Ladys in the universe.”18
The scholarship which presumes that the imperial harem was a symbol of female
subordination also takes for granted that the women in it had no legitimate ability to exercise
power or agency. In fact, in the last several hundred years of the Ottoman Empire, imperial

Pierce, “Beyond Harem Walls,” 42.
Robert Halsband, ed., The Complete Letters of lady Mary Wortley Montagu, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965-67), 406.
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women became the chief political strategists of the sultanate.19 Sultan Suleyman I appointed his
wife, Hurrem Sultan, as his consulate soon after their marriage around 1520.20 As the consulate,
she held power in the imperial court, was influential in state matters, and especially in
international affairs.21 In fact, her rise to power as consulate to the sultan marked the beginning
of the era in Ottoman history known as the “Sultanate of Woman.”22 What followed during this
era was a period where women could rise to power and wealth, not only as concubines and queen
mothers, but through administration. Despite being secluded from the outside world, imperial
women during this era came to essentially control political power in the empire.23
Symbols of female imperial power can be seen in Turkey still today. Since the practice of
seclusion was also observed by the sultan, patronage through art and architecture was the
primary tool used to extend the sultan’s visibility across the empire.24 The exercise of patronage
through art and architecture by royal women following the reign of Suleyman were
demonstrations of their increased power.25 Valide sultan Nurbanu not only built her own
mosque, the Atik Valide Mosque, but built it within the imperial capital of Istanbul.26 Valide
Sultan Turhan also demonstrated her power through the construction of a mosque, but more
notably commissioned two military strongholds, the Seddulbahir and Kumkale forts, on the
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Dardanelles strait.27 The Dardanelles strait was arguably one of the most important naval
passages of the kingdom as it forms a continental boundary between Europe and Asia, connects
the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas to the Sea of Marmara, and even allows passage to the Black
Sea. The commission of two military strongholds on such a strategically vital naval passage was
a remarkable, and intentional, expression of valide sultan Turhan’s power, enforcing her image
as protector of the empire.28
Furthermore, several historians have examined the kadi court registers of the Ottoman
Empire in multiple regions to demonstrate that women had a great deal of economic freedom.
Ronald Jennings, for example, examined the court records to study the position of women in the
rural area of Kayersi. Jennings provided evidence that women enjoyed a certain degree of social
equality. They appeared freely in court, sued people, and owned and sold property. 29 However,
due to the rural nature of Kayersi, evidence from Kayersi’s work fell short in illustrating the
status of women in economic activities outside of property transactions, such as artisanship,
trade, and agriculture.
Haim Gerber followed Jenning’s work by examining the kadi registers of Bursa, a large,
urban commercial center in the Ottoman Empire provided by the Archaeological Museum of
Bursa. Gerber found that women in Bursa not only appeared freely in court, sued people, and
owned and sold property, but bought property, owned and ran their own businesses, oversaw the
administration of their agricultural lands such as vineyards and orchards, invested in commercial
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ventures, and owned and worked “in-cottage” artisanal businesses such as wool-making and silkspinning ventures.30
Gerber noted that the ability of women to purchase property was the most revealing
artifact regarding women’s economic status. Previously, scholarship had assumed that women
owned property only through inheritance, but multiple court transactions revealed that women, in
fact, purchased property freely. Additionally, Gerber examined court records of posthumous
estates of women, which revealed that husbands often inherited property from their wives.
Gerber also found several cases of women who took out credit from moneylenders for various
purposes and even cases of women who made loans to others, including their own husbands.
That women in the Middle East had this sort of economic agency as early as the 1600s should
not be lost on Western feminists, especially considering that women in America required the
permission of their husbands to open bank accounts as recently as the 1960’s.
One of the trademarks of the Ottoman Empire was its decentralized millet court system.
To easily integrate new territories, the empire provided a certain degree of autonomy to
provincial governments by allowing their local, confessional courts to operate concurrently with
the Islamic courts. That meant Christian and Judaic communities had their own codes of law and
courts to which they could bring all manners of cases, except criminal cases which were tried
exclusively in Islamic courts. Marc Baer and Fatma Göçek examined three registers from an
Islamic court in Galata from the years 1729, 1769, and 1789. Among their findings, they noted
that over time increasing numbers of non-Muslim women brought their cases to the Islamic
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courts.31 They conjectured that this was likely because Islamic law gave women better terms than
Christian or Judaic law, especially in cases of inheritance and divorce. At the time, Christian and
Judaic law explicitly forbid women from seeking divorce, while Islamic law gave women the
ability to seek divorce at least under specified conditions.
With that said, a prominent matter for Egyptian feminists was the issue of family law
where patriarchy was most heavily enshrined by making female obedience a matter of law. The
fact that the millet system allowed concurrent confessional courts for Christian and Judaic
communities is important here, because Christian, Judaic, and Islamic courts observed similar
family laws which all made female obedience a matter of legal obligation. Bier points out in her
book that the concurrent courts reformed these family laws across confessions as Egyptian
women progressed their case for liberation.32 This is an important point to remember because it
demonstrates that religion had little to do with the enshrinement of female subordination in
Egyptian family law. The struggle to reform these laws was not hard-won because any one
religion was entrenched in Egyptian culture, but because those who retain power are usually
unwilling to relinquish it.
This evidence cannot, and should not, be used to shake the notion of male supremacy in
the Middle East. It would be misleading to presume that these facts constituted equality between
the genders. Women of the Ottoman Empire very much lived in a world whose boundaries were
defined by male orders. Those women who broke boundaries were viewed as a threat. For
example, Hurrem Sultan was often regarded as a witch, by both men of the Ottoman Empire and
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men of competing Western monarchies.33 Furthermore, the rise of the “Sultanate of Women,” is
often blamed for the decline of the Ottoman Empire by male scholarship.34
However, according to historians of the period, women in the Ottoman Empire did have
greater rights to social and economic participation than their European counterparts of the time.
Therein lies the quagmire of examining the status of women in the Middle East: It is objectively
wrong to suggest that complete gender equality existed or exists in the Middle East. However,
it’s also objectively wrong to suggest that the gender inequality experienced in the Middle East is
unique or caused by religion and culture. Put simply, to be born a woman in basically any part of
the world at almost any point in world history has always meant facing forms of gendered
violence and oppression. To objectively examine the status of women and the history of
women’s movements in Egypt, diligence must be taken to remove the lens the Western gaze.
That is why in the following examination of Egypt, there will be little attention given to religious
orders. While religion does constitute a powerful system in any region, the use of religion to
enforce patriarchal values is often because religious orders are exclusively male orders. That was
the case in Egypt and the Middle East. Furthermore, their power in Egypt was upheld by
patriarchal systems and processes through government, law, and thought production. Thus, it will
be these systems and processes that will be the point of investigation.
The Beginning of Colonization in Egypt
Egypt’s struggle against colonial powers began in 1798 when Napoleon Bonaparte
attempted to imperialize Egypt under French rule.35 Egypt held a strategic waterway via the Suez
Canal, which offered passage to British-colonized India from the Mediterranean Sea. France’s
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occupation of Egypt was thus a threat to Britain’s imperial interests.36 The Ottoman Empire and
Britain joined forces in order to drive Napoleon out of Egypt and declared war in September of
1798.37 French forces surrendered by 1801.38 Egyptian-born historian Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid
Marsot argues that France’s three-year occupation was too short lived to leave any real lasting
effects on Egypt itself, since the French were never able to assert total control of the region. 39
Yet, Napoleon’s invasion did change the course of Egypt’s trajectory as it drew Britain into the
global hegemonic struggle of the Middle East, while simultaneously marking the decline of the
Ottoman Empire’s Mamluk army.40
When Pasha Muhammad ‘Ali “forced the Ottoman government to appoint him as
governor of Egypt in 1805,”41 he both inherited the wider Ottoman struggle against foreign
exploitation and initiated a growing autonomy away from the Ottoman Empire.42 Pasha ‘Ali
arrived in Egypt with the Ottoman Mamluks to drive out French forces from the region.43
Following his appointment, he embarked on a project towards Egyptian agency. He first
eliminated the last vestige of Ottoman control in Egypt by assassinating all members of the
Ottoman Mamluk army by 1811.44 Then, ‘Ali embarked on a series of modernizing reforms to
secure Egyptian agency from the Ottoman Empire.
‘Ali consolidated power by bringing Egypt’s religious center, al-Azhar, under state
control. While al-Azhar retained authority of Quranic interpretation and instruction, ‘Ali claimed
authority of selecting the mufti who was charged with issuing fatwa, or religious rulings, which
36
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essentially brought the religious elite under state-tutelage.45 ‘Ali also expanded education by
establishing a concurrent, secular education system,46 while allowing the establishment of
private, Western missionary schools in the state.47 Furthermore, ‘Ali reformed Egypt’s legal
system to create the Mixed Courts, which were adjudicated by laws modeled after French civil
code.48 ‘Ali also established an independent Egyptian military, served by conscripted soldiers,49
and constructed new weapon factories that could produce 1,600 muskets per month by the end of
the 1830s.50 He also ventured to create an Egyptian navy and in 1826 he established a naval
school which was instructed by French officers,51 built a ship yard in the Alexandrian port, and
constructed a naval fleet.52
‘Ali’s ambitions were, however, costly. Under the Ottoman Empire, landowners collected
property taxes and often retained much of the taxes for themselves, which put a drain on state
revenue.53 ‘Ali instituted direct taxation to invigorate the state coffer. ‘Ali invested in Egyptian
agriculture,54 expanded irrigation,55 and created an Egyptian export economy in Alexandria all to
finance his ambitions for Egyptian agency.56 Though ‘Ali’s irrigation projects were completed
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with what was essentially slave labor,57 and ‘Ali’s new state military and navy consisted of
conscripted soldiers, it was not enough to finance his massive undertakings.
Instead, ‘Ali largely financed his endeavors with foreign debt. Thus, an unintended
consequence of ‘Ali’s work was that Egypt’s blossoming independence was simultaneously
threatened by foreign intrusion. In fact, ‘Ali and his predecessors relied so heavily on highinterest, foreign debt to pursue independence and modernization, that by the 1870s the state
required new loans in order to meet its interest payments alone.58 By 1876, Egypt was bankrupt
and foreign powers established the Public Debt Commission (PDC), which was charged with
collecting the debt by electing a British and French creditor who would, together, control the
Egyptian budget.59
‘Ali’s reliance on foreign debt to finance his projects was further complicated by
Ottoman-era capitulations, which provided merchants and corporations of foreign countries the
ability to conduct business without regulation or taxation by the Egyptian state.60 Historian
Carter Finley argues that ability of European nations to assert economic dominance through
commercial capitulations “bears a striking resemblance” to the methods used by capitalist states
in free trade agreements.61 As shall later be demonstrated, the continuation of the capitulations in
Egypt during Egypt’s industrialization would have grave consequences for not only workingclass Egyptians, but for Egyptian sovereignty.
The establishment of the PDC over the Egyptian government was a significant loss of
autonomy and an insult to Egyptian nationalists’ sense of pride. Coupled with the seeming
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“Westernization” of Egypt, through the establishment of private, Western missionary schools,
new legal codes, an increasing presence of foreign commerce, anti-European tensions inevitably
surfaced. A nationalist revolt against the PDC invoked British reaction when it threatened the
imperial monarchy’s access to the Suez Canal. In 1882, Britain invaded Egypt and inaugurated
an occupation that would last for more than 70 years.62 Nationalist tensions erupted frequently
during those 70 years and provided the foundation for the Egyptian feminist movement to build a
female identity around Egyptian nationalism and political activism.
Women in early 20th century Egypt
While gender was a pervasive point of oppression for all women, class defined women’s
lives far more than any other distinction did.63 While most women across the Ottoman Empire
would not have been exposed to the seclusion of the harem, those in the higher economic
stratospheres were. For this reason, awareness of a gendered restriction to opportunity first
emerged among women of the middle and upper-classes.
Huda Sha’rawi explains in her autobiography, The Harem Years, that she learned
alongside her brother from a private tutor as a young girl, but her education stopped when she
was married at twelve.64 She separated from her husband two years later and embarked on a
seven-year period of independence during which she continued her education, able to expand her
life “within the parameters allowed by her class and circumstances.”65 Sha’rawi would go on to
create the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) and cement herself in history as one of Egypt’s most
influential early feminists.
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Like Sha’rawi, Nabawiyah Musa learned from a private tutor alongside her brother. In
her personal writings, Musa remembers how she became aware of her secondary status as a girl
when her brother continued his education formally in a classroom, but she was required to stay at
home. Despite the restrictions placed upon her, Musa taught herself to read and write Arabic, and
to perform arithmetic with the books her brother brought home.66 Eventually, she applied to the
Saniyah School in secret and only coerced consent from her mother to attend the school by
threatening to run away.67
She would go on to become one of Egypt’s first female teachers and the world’s first
advocates equal pay for women after she discovered that she made less than her male
counterparts because she hadn’t passed the state baccalaureate examination as the men had.68 Of
course, women had never been allowed to sit for the examination. Musa applied for the exam and
was rebuffed several times, but she persisted and eventually tested in 1907. Thus, she became the
first Egyptian woman to win her baccalaureate diploma and, at the same time, “the first woman
teacher to receive a salary equal to male teachers.”69 In so doing, Musa helped to set a precedent
of equal work for equal pay between women and men in Egypt, a policy which the postindependence government continued to observe. However, education was a privilege of middle
and upper-class Egyptian families. Working-class families, men and women alike, often didn’t
have access to formal education. To spread their feminist awareness, a major preoccupation of
early Egyptian women’s rights groups was improving access to education.
The British occupation introduced an increasing threat to Egypt’s sense of cultural
authenticity, while the capitulations marginalized the local Egyptian economy. A growing
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nationalist awareness among Egyptians transformed into what women’s liberation advocate,
Nawal el-Saadawi, calls “identity politics.” She holds that identity politics are “part of the
colonial capitalist language.”70 During the colonial period, identity politics transformed under the
European production of nationalism, the idea that those who share a common identity should
form an individual nationhood. Nationalism was used by world hegemonic powers to undermine
the Ottoman Empire by coaxing revolts in Greece and in the Balkans.71 Identity politics were
two-fold in Egypt. First, there were the politics of Egyptian nationalism and what was
determined to be authentically Egyptian. Second, there were the politics of anti-imperialism, the
threat of “Westernization,” and the corrosion of Egyptian authenticity at the hands of colonizers.
Identity politics had dual effects for women. On the one hand, early Egyptian feminists,
men and women alike, would advocate for women’s liberation in nationalist and anti-Western
terms. For example, many Egyptians advocated for opening Egyptian state schools to women on
the basis that Egyptian women had historically attended Western missionary schools.72 However,
identity politics simultaneously allowed patriarchal systems to preserve their power by
embedding the subordination of women into nationalist identity. Certain aspects of women’s
oppression were upheld as an intrinsic part of Egyptian authenticity and those who dared to
challenge those aspects were accused of colluding with the colonizers. This meant that while
women now attended school, this new-found freedom still had gendered limitations.
Regardless, the emergence of identity politics provided space for Egyptian feminists to
make their demands. A male Islamic judge, Qasim Amin, published two papers in 1899 and 1900
which both argued that to liberate Egypt from foreign domination, Egypt had to liberate women
70
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from male domination.73 EFU founder Sha’rawi wrote in a 1924 pamphlet, “women are half the
nation and the caretakers of future generations, and thus they must be prepared to take up their
political and social obligations to the nation.”74 Early women’s rights narratives were
overwhelmingly tied progress for women to women’s roles in relation to men and, therefore, to
the nation.
Some early feminists did argue for women’s liberation from a human rights standard,
such as Zaynab Fawwaz, who advocated for female suffrage in Jaridat al-Nil (Newspaper of the
Nile). She wrote, “Woman is a human being as man is, with complete mental faculties and
acumen, and equivalent parts, capable of performing according to her own abilities.”75
Regardless of the narrative, an emerging nationalist awareness did create an important possibility
for women to make new demands, even if the scope of those demands was limited by patriarchal
systems. A nationalist advocacy for female empowerment opened the door for new opportunities
to Egyptian women. Women’s education by the state began with a women’s medical school at
Abu Zabal, a military hospital near Cairo.76 A girls section at the Abbas Primary School in Cairo
was opened in 1895, the Saniyah School which Musa attended was created in 1889, and the
Wardiyah Women Teachers’ Training School was established in 1916.77
The end of the nineteenth century also gave women’s voices a new platform through
literature and media. Al-Fatah, the Women’s Press, was founded in 1892 and promised to
“defend the rights of the deprived and draw attention to [their] obligations due.”78 It was a new
claim on public space for middle and upper-class women, who had once not been permitted to
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speak in public.79 However, the space claimed was an ideological one in the production of public
thought. The divergence of women along class distinctions was important to the early Egyptian
feminist movement for three reasons. First, because it was necessary for Egyptian peasant
women to work, it appeared that they enjoyed a host of abilities that middle and upper-class
women were denied. Egyptian peasant women had claims on public space, they were able to
venture out of the home with their faces uncovered and to mingle in the markets with men.80 For
this reason, to upper-class women particularly, the “peasant woman symbolized freedom.”81
Second, the inability of middle and upper-class women to enter public space due to the tradition
of the harem prevented early feminists from spreading their feminist awareness. Finally, a lack of
access to education and the more immediate problems they faced due to poverty, impeded
Egyptian peasant women from having a real stake in the issue of women’s rights.
Early feminists responded to each of these problems through the proliferation of
philanthropic organizations. The inheritance rights Muslim women enjoyed enabled them to give
charitably. However, philanthropic giving was traditionally performed through donations to
religious endowments, called waqfs, which were then administered by a male executor.82 Early
Egyptian feminists broke from the tradition of giving to waqfs when they created the first
female-led philanthropic societies. For example, Sha’rawi founded Mabarrat Muhammad ‘Ali in
1909.83 Djavidan Hanim, the wife of Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II, organized an aid operation at Ras
al-Tin Palace to help refugees of the Balkan Wars.84 In 19191, Jam’iyat al-Mar’ah al-Jadidah
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(the New Woman Society) was established to educate girls in reading and writing, as well as
crafts, which feminists believed could be used as a means to earn money.85
Some scholars have critiqued these organizations as an expression of middle and upperclass women’s paternalism toward Egyptian peasant women, particularly because some provided
training in “domestic science,” such as health, hygiene, and child care.86 Laura Bier, for example,
argues that it was akin to privileged Egyptian women dictating to impoverished Egyptian women
what it meant to be good mothers and wives.87 Yet, it must be understood that during this period,
child mortality rates were high, tuberculosis was rampant, clean water was scarce, water-borne
diseases killed many Egyptians with the largest populations being the rural-poor, and a lack of
higher education for women meant that most Egyptian women simply didn’t see doctors because
there weren’t female doctors available.88 Training in health, hygiene, and child care very literally
saved lives. Furthermore, the creation of female-ran charities provided feminists an opportunity
to create a communal womanhood. It introduced a new collective role for women as citizens of
Egypt, “rather than as members of separate religious communities.”89
Still, the adoption of these narratives tied the justification of women’s rights to their roles
in the family. Women’s education was permitted because it enabled mothers to impress upon
their children the values of Egyptian nationalism. This effectively set parameters for reform to
women’s rights as being inherited through their roles within the nuclear, patriarchal family. Yet
women’s roles within the nuclear, patriarchal family were problematic for women as the family
laws of Egypt legislated female obedience within the family across religious confession. The
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consequence of this narrative was that women’s roles, both in the nation and the family, were
controlled by patriarchy. Thus, though early Egyptian feminists fought to rewrite the family laws
which made female obedience a matter of legal obligation, serious amendment wasn’t
accomplished until 1979.
Both ‘Ali and the British colonizing government were complicit in preserving the
oppression of women within the patriarchal, nuclear family. ‘Ali established European-modeled
civil codes with the Mixed Courts in 1876 and the British occupiers established the National
Courts over criminal and commercial disputes in 1883. However, both governments allowed all
matters of family law to remain under the jurisdiction of the millet system. This meant laws
regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody were adjudicated by concurrent,
confessional courts. Bier argues that the failure to modernize laws regarding the family,
“Politicized the family […] as a repository of group identity.”90 Though agriculture, trade,
industry, the military, education, and even the legal system modernized, the patriarchal, nuclear
family was upheld as a subject outside the purview of state reform.
Family laws enshrined male tyranny across confession. Bier notes that even though
Coptic family laws held different beliefs regarding the nature of marriage than Islam, that
“contemporaneous changes in Coptic family law mirrored the general trends toward reform in
the Muslim personal status laws.”91 One such family law was that of bayt al-ta’a, which
translates literally to “house of obedience.”92 Women who ran away from their husbands,
regardless of the reason, could be returned to her husband by state force. 93 The law legally
bound women to suffer the tyranny of their husbands. Over time, the preservation of such family
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laws enabled patriarchists to claim that female oppression within the family was inherent to
Egyptian cultural authenticity. That meant attempts to reform family law could be cast as
assaults to the Egyptian nationalist identity.
However, it must be recognized that this kind of legally protected male tyranny within
the family was not uniquely Egyptian, or even Middle Eastern. Historian and professor at
Georgetown University, Amira Sonbol, details how the doctrine of bayt al-ta’a was in fact
modeled after the European doctrine of “coverture.” Coverture dictated that, upon being married,
a woman lost entirely her individual legal status to her husband. With this loss, her husband
could incarcerate her for being disobedient, “enforced by the state through its courts and
police.”94 The disingenuous portrayal of male tyranny within the family as inherent to Egyptian
cultural authenticity was truly an exercise of male tyranny over Egypt at large. It was an attempt
by patriarchists to maintain power because, once again, those who retain power, are usually
unwilling to relinquish it.
The 1919 Revolution
Egyptian nationalist tensions had been brewing under British occupation decades before
the 1919 revolution. In 1911, the Egyptian Nationalist Congress convened in Heliopolis. Women
weren’t permitted to attend, so Bahithat al-Badiyah wrote a letter articulating the demands of her
feminist comrades, addressing both British colonialism and Egyptian patriarchy. Her list of
demands for women included equal opportunity to education and work, equal rights to
participate in congregational worship, suffrage, and reform of family law. 95

Sonbol, Amira, “The woman follows the nationality of her husband: Guardianship, citizenship and gender,” in
Hawwa: Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Islamic World, Vol 1, 2003: 112. For more, see: Zaher,
Claudia, “When A Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law
Doctrine of Coverture,” in Law Library Journal, Vol. 94:3, 2002, 459-486.
95
Badran, 69.
94

25

The revolution began in Egypt following the end of World War I, when the Versailles
Peace Conference convened in 1919. Egyptian men formed the Wafd Party and its leaders
demanded that the British High Commissioner allow their organization to represent Egypt at the
conference.96 This demand was denied. British authorities arrested the Wafd party’s leader, Sa’d
Zaghlul. Egyptians responded with strikes in Cairo that soon spread across the nation.97
Revolution was brewing and women’s participation became instrumental to the nationalist cause.
Upper-class women staged single sex demonstrations while lower-class women rose up
in street protests with men.98 On March 14th, a woman named Hamidah Khalil became the first
woman martyr when she was killed by British police in front of the Husayn Mosque.99 Many
more women would join her in sacrifice. Together, they became national symbols of the
Egyptian struggle. Two days after Khalil’s murder, women marched in a procession to mourn
Khalil’s death. The women “carried flags with crescents and crosses, brandishing the national
unity of Muslims and Copts in the face of colonial ‘divide and rule.’”100 The protest was
eventually surrounded and forced to disperse, but the women persisted and held a second
demonstration four days later. One British police commander wrote of the significance of
women’s protests in a letter to his son when he lamented that using force against women
invariably put British police “in the wrong.”101 During their occupation, the British conscripted
Egyptians and in his later memoirs the same British police commander noted that, “a few
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soldiers became very upset and actually wept” while they were forced to police the protests
staged by Egyptian women.102
Even Egyptian girls became militant by distributing secret circulars at their schools, an
activity that was immeasurably dangerous given the heavy police surveillance of the British
colonial government.103 In 1920, Egyptian women formed the Lajnat al-Wafd al-Markaziyah lilSayyidat, the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee. Badran writes that “when male Wafdist
leaders were jailed or exiled, Wafdist women took charge. They maintained contact with Wafdist
men, as well as with the British authorities. They handled finances. They kept up morale. They
supported workers’ strikes, organized boycotts, sold shares in Bank Misr, the new national bank,
and collected money and jewelry to finance the cause.”104
In the beginning of 1922, Britain unilaterally issued partial Egyptian independence.
Partial, because it was conditioned upon four reservations: continued security of British imperial
communications, continued British control of the Egyptian military, continued enforcement of
Ottoman-era capitulations, and the partition of the Sudan from Egypt which remained under
British colonization.105 The continuation of the capitulations enabled the British government to
effectively command the Egyptian economy by keeping foreign industry in the region outside of
regulation and taxation by the Egyptian state. While other foreign powers took advantage of the
privilege afforded by the capitulations, British companies owned large economic stakes within
the region. For example, the Suez Canal was and remains Egypt’s largest center of commerce
since it’s the port through which all products are imported and exported. The Suez Canal,
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however, was owned and administered by the Suez Canal Company—a British-French
enterprise.106
Both the women and men’s Wafdist parties objected to partial-independence to no avail.
Wafdist men conceded when Egyptians were given formal political rights to elect a parliament
and write an Egyptian constitution that was finalized by 1923. The constitution of 1923 declared
equality among all Egyptians in Article 3. It stated, “[Egyptians] equally enjoy civil and political
rights and are equally subjected to duties and public obligations without regard to race, language,
or religion.”107 Though the language specifically excluded gender, Articles 74 and 82 provided
universal suffrage. Cleveland describes the 1923 constitution as Egypt’s most genuine attempt at
parliamentary democracy.108 However, the extent of democracy was deeply circumscribed by
awarding the British-backed monarchy extensive powers, “including the right to appoint the
prime minister and [to] dissolve parliament.”109 King Fuad dismissed parliamentary governments
frequently, whenever they challenged his authority. Thus, the Egyptian monarchy existed as a
surrogate of British imperial rule as it relied on British support to command the country.110
The conclusion of the 1919 revolution was worse for Egyptian women. Three weeks after
the constitution’s passage, an amendment was passed by the interim government which restricted
suffrage and ability to hold public office from women.111 Furthermore, Article 32 of the
constitution “also declared that [the] fraternity of citizens was the source of all legal and political
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power in the new parliamentary system.”112 The language provided a gendered definition of
citizenship, not a definition which provided different rights and obligations to women and men,
but a definition which effectively barred women from citizenship altogether. The participation of
Wafd men in the passage of these amendments was a proverbial slap in the face to the women
who had organized the revolution while they were behind bars. EFU women parted from the
Wafd party. Other women, however, remained and reconstituted themselves as al-Lajnah alSa’diyah lil-Sayyidat (Committee of Sa’dist Women), a group that pledged loyalty to Wafd
leader Sa’d Zaghlul.113 Thus, there was also a partition between women—feminist nationalists
who leaned liberal and Wafd nationalist women who leaned conservative.
Women After the 1919 Revolution
Following the creation of the 1923 constitution, feminists recalibrated their efforts. The
EFU organized itself around a litany of issues: ending the capitulations, ending state-regulated
prostitution, creating equal opportunity for women in education and work, obtaining political
enfranchisement for women, and reforming Egyptian family laws.
The Capitulations
The continuation of the capitulations meant that the new Egyptian government could not
prevent Europeans from conducting any business, nor could they regulate or tax European
enterprise. As the industrial revolution spread around the world, Egypt developed into an export
economy of mostly cotton. The common enterprises of the working-class, such as agriculture and
artisanship, disappeared over time and manufacturing in European-owned factories became the
main source of employment for working-class Egyptians.114 The continued enforcement of the
capitulations rendered labor laws futile, since labor laws could be applied to Egyptian-owned
112
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businesses only. This included labor laws such as the 1909 law which prohibited factories from
employing children under the age of nine.115 A lack of labor legislation meant the welfare of
Egypt’s largely working-class population could not be protected. Furthermore, the
industrialization of Egypt and the disappearance of cottage industries, meant that working-class
women sank deeper into poverty as manufacturing jobs were reserved primarily for men.116
In 1926 the EFU took their fight to the IWSA (regrouped as the International Alliance of
Women after European women had won their pursuit of suffrage). They called on the IAW to
make a resolution demanding an end to the capitulations.117 The IAW passed no such resolution
and left the capitulations unaddressed by any resolution until their 1935 congress in Istanbul.
Furthermore, the IAW passed the resolution demanding an end to the capitulations only to coerce
support from Egyptian feminists on the matter of women’s nationality laws. Custom held that
women who married foreigners relinquished their own nationality in favor of their husband’s.
The IAW sought to pass a resolution to reform this practice, however Egyptian feminists
maintained that the existence of the capitulations would make such a resolution impossible to
lobby in Egypt.118 At the time of the 1935 resolution, Egypt was the only country still forced to
observe the capitulations. In 1937, the capitulations were formally absolved.119
State-Regulated Prostitution
Under Pasha ‘Ali’s rule, the Egyptian state banned prostitution from Cairo to Upper
Egypt.120 However, after British colonization, the state began to regulate prostitution because it
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was unable to prevent European prostitutes from conducting business due to the enforcement of
the capitulations.121 To dissuade women from prostitution, the Egyptian state imposed new taxes
and regulations which, under the capitulations, applied exclusively to Egyptian women.122
Since most new employment opportunities were factory jobs reserved for men,
prostitution was the most viable work for many working-class Egyptian women. The imperialist
dimension of state-licensed prostitution under the capitulations affected Egyptian women in a
multitude of ways. Notably, Egyptian prostitutes made far less than their European counterparts,
regardless of the taxes imposed upon them.123 A free market off of which women’s bodies could
be profited also meant trafficking of women and young girls through coercion and violence. 124
Furthermore, Egyptians were expressly barred from joining many of the anti-prostitution
organizations operating in the state. For example, the Committee for the Suppression of Traffic
in Women and Children forbid membership to Egyptians until 1943.125
Egyptian feminists had multiple strategies in ending state-regulated prostitution. Their
primary tactic was fighting the capitulations. They also provided women training in incomegenerating activities to encourage women to leave brothels, and even proposed a tax on
unmarried men to finance rehabilitative programs for former-prostitutes.126 Feminists also wrote
to Islamic leaders for support and though Shaykh al-Azhar praised their efforts, he “did not push
the issue politically.”127 The religious establishment would mobilize against women’s education
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on the grounds that it jeopardized women’s sexual purity, yet never formally challenged
prostitution.
Although the capitulations ended in 1937, state-regulated prostitution continued. In 1939
the Ministry of Social Affairs was created and charged with regulating licensed houses of
prostitution.128 Its new deputy minister, ‘Abd al-Mu’min Riyad, said that the matter of stateregulated prostitution required a “gradual approach.”129 Ten years after the creation of the
Ministry of Social Affairs, state-licensing for prostitution ended. However, only in 1953 was
prostitution completely outlawed.130
Expanding Women’s Education and Work
Following the 1919 revolution, the EFU continued its fight for female education.
However, the class-structures of Egyptian society permeated the feminist struggle. Badran writes
that, “upper-class girls were kept out of the ordinary state schools by their families and rarely
attended university until after the 1952 revolution.”131 The EFU formulated its support of female
education in nationalist terms by arguing that women’s education was “the key to restoring
national greatness.”132 Feminists called upon the state to use state-provided education to instill
nationalist sentiment in Egyptians. For example, after teaching under the British-colonial school
system, Nabawiyyah Musa lamented that it offered Egyptian students un-Egyptian curriculum.
She wrote, “Our children would acquire a sense of nationalism from their Egyptian teachers that
they do not get from foreign teachers.”133
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Nationalist narratives for women’s education helped the EFU to successfully lobby the
state to open secondary schools for girls not only in cities like Cairo, but in provinces like Asyut,
Tanta, and Mansurah.134 In order to assuage upper-class families to send their daughters to
school, the state also opened two elite schools.135 Enrollment of women in secondary schools
tripled between 1925 and 1935.136 Women also exceeded their male counterparts in school
performance. In 1930, 57.7 percent of girls who sat for the baccalaureate examination and 52.9
percent of girls who sat for the primary school examination passed, while only 47.5 and 43.3
percent of boys passed the same exams, respectively.137
Yet, gendered narratives regarding women’s education persevered. For example,
conservative voices protested that women’s higher education failed to inculcate them with a
sense of the “woman’s duty.”138 The Ministry of Education responded by opening schools
dedicated to educating women on motherhood and domestic sciences the following year.139
Additionally, conservatives worried that desegregation through women’s education would lead
to moral degradation. The two elite schools opened for upper-class women adhered to strict
segregation rules to the extent that male teachers and servants were forbidden.140 When a
reactionary conservative, Isma’il Sidqi, rose to power, he closed university education to women,
arguing that “it is repugnant for us to see young women students enter into contact with the male
students.”141 However, women’s education persisted after the regime fell in 1933.
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While female education expanded significantly during the interwar period, work for
women was a different breed of challenge. Badran surmises that this was because “work for
middle-class women constituted a far more threatening challenge to middle-class patriarchal
culture than did education.”142 School curriculum could be formulated to fit within the
boundaries of prescribed female domesticity, while employment for women could not. Women’s
work also reduced female dependency upon husbands and family patriarchs for economic
support. Additionally, it challenged the male monopoly of the workplace. Under the economic
duress caused by the capitulations, the Egyptian male order vehemently opposed additional
competition for employment that women’s work imposed. Egyptian men argued that women
should not be allowed to work in jobs that would, otherwise, go to men while also insisting that
women’s employment would not only cause neglect towards women’s familial roles, but lead to
their moral degradation.143
In 1933, the Egyptian parliament passed new labor laws regulating women’s role in the
workplace. The staple of these new labor laws was Article 10, which enumerated types of work
forbidden to women. Badran writes, “This included labor considered physically taxing or
dangerous, such as working in mines or foundries, manufacturing explosives, coating mirrors
with mercury, and handling lead.”144 The narrative that work could lead to women’s moral
degradation was enshrined in Article 10 by prohibiting any work that included handling alcohol
and slaughtering animals. Women were also forbidden from operating or supervising the
operation of machinery, but were, however, allowed to clean it. This “[regulated] them to the less
technologically advanced sector of production.”145 Other parts of the law were intended to
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control exploitation of women in the workplace by requiring them to receive an hour of rest
during each working day.146
Bier argues that the labor laws of 1933 and the EFU’s participation in crafting them are
exemplary of the EFU’s paternalistic role toward the working-class women of Egypt. She writes
that early Egyptian feminists “accepted the paternalism of liberal-nationalism, in part because it
gave them authority [...] to perform public work so that they could instruct working-class and
rural women how to become proper citizens.”147 Middle and upper-class women were the first
patrons of expanded rights to women’s education and work. The 1930s labor laws demonstrated
the EFU’s concerns for issues that plagued working-class women like low pay, long hours, and
lack of legal protections. However, it also conceptualized the Egyptian working-class woman as
distinct from the Egyptian working-class man, with different rights, responsibilities, and
obligations owed.
Though working-class women found opportunities to work deeply circumscribed during
the interwar period, those armed with higher educations, namely middle and upper-class women,
found the period more favorable. Women began their careers as doctors in the early 1930s,
which faced little popular objection since female doctors could perform needed services without
precipitating any questions of modesty or sexual purity.148 The first woman to enter the Egyptian
bar was admitted in 1933.149 Prior to her admittance, one Egyptian cleric “declared that women
must not practice law because their voices should not be heard in public,” a theory which
feminists argued against by pointing out that women gave testimony in court.150
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Thus, Bier’s argument offers a degree of nuance. The 1933 labor laws, which forbid
women from various jobs, had relatively little impact on middle and upper-class women since
they didn’t seek industry-based work. At the same time, the 1933 labor laws written to protect
women implicitly recognized the exploitation working-class Egyptians faced. Yet, only women
and children necessitated legal protection. Even then, the 1933 labor laws aiming to protect
women and children would remain difficult to enforce until the revocation of the capitulations in
1937. Therein rests the quandary of intersections: the activists caught between them are divided
between which oppressions to address. On the one hand, women faced interpersonal gendered
oppression both intimately in the home and publicly in Egypt at large. On the other hand,
working-class Egyptians faced oppression through workplace exploitation as the world over did
during the industrial revolution. However, Egypt further faced the challenge of being crushed
under an international system, which prevented them from making any serious progress with
regards to their personal welfare or the welfare of their nation and its future. The assumption that
such moves on part of the EFU are due to a sense of elitism, should be cautioned against.
Perhaps the mistake for Egyptian feminists wasn’t a realized complicity in replicating systems of
oppression, but an understood bargain made with those systems to achieve their feminist agenda
little by little. However, that bargain produced unintended consequences for poor women in
Egypt. Unfortunately, those consequences would not be confined to women’s work.
Political Enfranchisement
After political enfranchisement was restricted from Egyptian women following the
amendment to the 1923 constitution, women were further forbidden from attending the opening
ceremonies of the new parliament. Egyptian women protested by holding their own mock
elections; their votes gave 77 seats to the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and only 12 seats to the

36

Wafd who had prevailed in the all-male elections.151 Though women were barred from attending
the opening ceremony, that same day the EFU and WWCC presented their demand for women’s
suffrage at the gates of parliament.152
Following that, the EFU took “a piecemeal approach to gaining political rights [by
suggesting] that the vote might be restricted to women of property or education,” which some
have blasted as an injustice, particularly because illiterate and unpropertied men could vote.153
However, the EFU then turned its social service programs towards helping women meet the
standard for obtaining the women’s political rights they advocated for, although it must be
emphasized that women still had no political rights. Journalist and EFU member Saiza Nabarawi
said, “For the moment the activity of the EFU is directed above all to make the masses aware of
the rights of the woman [and] to prepare [them] little by little for the idea of suffrage.”154
Overall, however, the matter of women’s suffrage took a rather peripheral seat in the EFU’s
platform throughout the decade which followed the revolution. They advocated harder and far
more loudly for women’s education, work, and reform of the family laws. Presumably, they
believed doing so would eventually make women’s suffrage inevitable.
That changed when Sidqi rose to power. His conservative, reactionary government
suspended parliament and effectively rendered the Egyptian constitution obsolete.155 Outrage
spread across the country when Sidqi suggested that free elections could be held, regardless.
Egyptian women came together across party lines to form a coalition that staged demonstrations
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and urged men to boycott the elections.156 Once more, Egyptian feminists rose up to defend their
nation. Furthermore, women were arrested during protests for the first time in Egyptian history.
Nabarawi wrote, “For the first time in our history, women were imprisoned for a political
question. This inaugurates a glorious page in Egyptian feminism.”157 By September 1933, Sidqi
had been overthrown and the matter of women’s suffrage was, once again, placed centerstage of
Egyptian feminist politics.
The EFU presented the case for women’s suffrage in Egypt at the following IAW
congress in Istanbul and pressed successive governments like that of Prime Minister ‘Ali Mahir
in 1936 and Mustafa Nahhas in 1937 and 1942, though both appeals proved unsuccessful.158
Feminists also harnessed the power of the women’s press by publishing articles. Nabarawi
submitted a piece to an essay contest sponsored by Prime Minister ‘Ali Mahir titled “The
Feminist Evolution and the Benefits That Accrue to the Public Well-Being.” The essay won firstplace, and yet won no action by Mahir’s government.159 In 1936, the Egyptian government
signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which provided permanent occupation of British troops in the
Suez Canal Zone. This intensified Egyptian women’s demands for political rights.160 Feminists
like Sha’rawi appealed to women directly by distributing leaflets in Arabic and French that said,
“Yes, you have the right and what is more the duty, before the ratification of a treaty, to call for a
referendum addressed to all the citizens of Egypt (men and women) permitting them to judge and
express freely their views and wishes.”161
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Following the 1936 treaty, feminist organizations consolidated to maximize their
mobilization for women’s suffrage. A founder of the Wafd Party’s first women’s periodical alAmal, Munirah Thabit, published an article in the EFU-founded al-Misriyah that demanded
women’s equal political rights.162 As mentioned, EFU and Wafd women parted ways following
the 1923 constitution. The choice of conservative-leaning Wafd women and liberal-leaning EFU
women to combine their efforts, despite their differences, is a testament to the importance that
women’s political enfranchisement took across ideological lines. Feminists directly challenged
male politicians by asking for their stance on women’s suffrage and, soon, politicians publicly
voiced their support for equal voting rights.163 However, their support stopped short of bringing
any legislation of consequence to parliament.
What is probably the most remarkable outcome of the Egyptian feminist movement, was
the formation of the Arab Feminist Union. It was one of the first markers of what would become
the pan-Arab movement. As women in Egypt amassed in support of universal suffrage across
party-lines, the EFU organized the first Arab Feminist Conference, at which Sha’rawi and other
feminists argued for, not only Egyptian women’s voting rights, but all Arab women’s voting
rights.164 Egyptian men and women at the conference argued that patriarchal politics enabled
men to legislate for men’s interests exclusively.165 The transformative power of Arab-unity
would be harnessed by future leaders, most notably in Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser
following the 1952 revolution. Unfortunately, despite decades of organization and advocation,
Egyptian women wouldn’t receive the right to vote and to hold public office until the
revolutionary constitution of 1953.
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Reforming Egyptian Family Laws
The family laws of Egypt enshrined women’s gendered roles and patriarchal power
within the family. Most exemplary of this was the practice of bayt al-ta’ah. It must be
remembered, that these sorts of family laws were not exclusively Islamic, and the other
concurrent confessional courts in the region observed the same types of laws. In fact, one
supporter of ta’a, Ali ‘Abd al-Wahid, argued that there was nothing “unique to Islamic law about
the principle of obedience: it was also a guiding principle of marriage as a moral and legal
institution in civilized countries generally.”166 He went on to make example of husbands in
France who, because they were responsible for the financial well-being of their wives, were
entitled to their obedience.
Egyptian feminists contended to reform “patriarchal excesses,” but what they regarded as
excess, many men regarded as their inalienable rights.167 Egyptian feminists were forced to
negotiate their advocacy for a reform of patriarchal excess without fundamentally challenging
the gendered roles envisioned by the family laws. Rather than challenging the idea that women
owed obedience to their husbands, for example, they argued that such obedience had to be
derived from consent.168 On the one hand, challenging these gendered roles directly meant
challenging national identity politics. Egyptian feminism was directly rooted in nationalism;
dividing themselves from their national identities risked undermining the feminist movement. On
the other hand, not challenging them would go on to impede feminists by embedding the idea
that women had inherently gendered roles to perform into nationalist discourse on women.
The family laws Egyptian feminists sought to reform were multiple: establishing a
minimum marriage age, extending a mother’s legal custody of her children, abolishing bayt al166
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ta’a, restricting polygamy, and regulating divorce claims made by men. The EFU successfully
campaigned to have the marriage age for girls set at sixteen in 1923, although “the state itself
was negligent” in regulating this law and often the law was outright ignored.169 In Egypt,
“mothers retained custody of daughters until the age of nine and sons until the age of seven,”
which the EFU successfully campaigned to have the ages increased by two years each. 170 The
EFU campaigned against bayt al-ta’ah by insisting that it was an overreach of male authority and
that a wife’s obedience had to be derived through consent. Yet, the practice wasn’t ended until
1967.171 The EFU advocated for a restriction of polygamy and demanded that “a man be
permitted to take a second wife only if his first wife were sterile or had an incurable illness.”172
Parliament passed a draft proposal to restrict polygamy, but the king vetoed it in 1927.173
Under Egyptian family laws, women and men both had rights to seek divorce. However,
a woman’s ability to do so was heavily conditioned, whereas “a man could repudiate his wife
simply by pronouncing a formula in her presence or absence, with no witnesses, and at any time
or place.”174 Rather than focusing on providing women greater freedom to seek divorce on their
terms, the EFU campaigned to restrict divorce for men “for serious reasons only, and only in the
presence of a qadi.”175 The 1929 revised law codes reformed divorce law only by invalidating
male divorce pronunciations made while intoxicated and conditioned women’s ability to seek
divorce on grounds of extreme harm, such as “the disappearance of a husband for four years.”176
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Feminists called upon the state to protect women from male tyranny, rather than
challenge the patriarchal structures of the family which permitted male tyranny altogether. When
the British-backed monarchy was overthrown in 1952, the revolutionary government formulated
its political ideologies around Egypt’s patriarchal nationalism. The revolutionary government
would go on to universalize suffrage, expand women’s education and employment, and even
allow women to hold public office. Yet, its patriarchal ideologies permeated the lives of women,
even as it purported to progress the feminist agenda.
The Rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser
In 1952, the Egyptian monarchy was overthrown in a revolt led by a group of young
military officers known as the Free Officers Movement. The rise of the Free Officers and their
leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, can be attributed to the nationalist campaign for total liberation
from British colonization. The objective of the revolutionary government was the development
of Egypt which, the Free Officers held, had been stifled under colonization.177 There were two
major evolutions in the Egyptian political system with the rise of Nasser. First, the state emerged
“as the arbiter of public order [and] the agent of social reform.”178 Second, the emergence of the
Cold War situated Egypt in the middle of an increasingly antagonistic struggle for world
hegemony.179
The continued presence of British troops and economic depression created violent
instability in Egypt. By the late 1940s, university students organized anti-British demonstrations
and some militant Egyptians embarked “in a systematic campaign of violence against foreigners,
foreign business establishments, and Egyptian officials regarded as accomplices of
177
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imperialism.”180 Skirmishes between Egyptian guerrillas and British armies erupted, and an
Egyptian police station was destroyed by British tanks, resulting in the death of fifty Egyptian
police officers.181 This led to riots in Cairo, known as Black Saturday, and then a military coup
on July 23, 1952 led by Nasser and the Free Officers.182
The Free Officers Movement was organized around a six-point program including “the
destruction of British colonialism and the removal of its Egyptian collaborators, the elimination
of feudalism, the ending of the political control of the state by foreign capital, the establishment
of social justice, the formation of a strong national army, and the creation of a healthy
democratic life.”183 The execution of the six-point program was conflicting in nature. The
objective of national autonomy through the abolition of foreign influence risked impeding
development projects and, especially, the creation of a strong Egyptian army. Nasser had to
finance his government, which “had to be premised on foreign assistance,” 184 and yet couldn’t
compromise the sovereignty of the new regime.
These two conflicting goals of national sovereignty and national development had the
potential to force Nasser’s hand in conceding to various demands of the Western hegemonic
powers. Of course, those powers attempted to bend Nasser to their will. For example, at the
behest of the British government who negotiated with Nasser from 1952-1954, the U.S. refused
to provide Egypt financial assistance in order to not increase Nasser’s leverage.185 However, the
emergence of the Cold War enabled Nasser to navigate this conflict by formulating a policy of
non-alignment. The policy of neutrality allowed Nasser “to maintain prospects for cooperation”
180
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with both the Soviets and the U.S.186 Nasser refused to cement any permanent relations with
either side without first securing total independence.187 This strategy ultimately secured a final
purge of British troops from the Suez Canal in October 1954.
Nasser embarked on a series of reforms, beginning with the land reforms of 1952 which
placed a cap on land ownership and redistributed land from wealthy landowners to Egyptian
peasants.188 In November 1953, Nasser issued a decree reclaiming the wealth and property of the
royal family of Pasha ‘Ali189 and appropriated the funds to building new schools and healthcare
centers in rural Egypt.190 A new constitution provided for a 350-member national assembly and
included a bill of rights which “protected Egyptians from discrimination on the grounds of race,
sex, language, or religion.”191 The adoption of the 1956 constitution enfranchised women
politically and created new opportunities to education and work. However, to complete its
reforms, Nasser also undertook a campaign to consolidate power.192 It was Egypt’s first flirtation
with homegrown despotism.
To this extent, the officers abolished political parties and established the Liberation Rally,
a party that “was not a party in the parliamentary sense of the term but rather a vehicle through
which the regime marshaled support for itself and gained control of such interest groups as
students and workers.”193 Nasser’s movement thus transformed from a military-led coup into a
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populist, authoritarian republic and soon took to executing members of rival organizations.194
Over time, Nasser’s tyranny grew. He endeavored on a pattern of criminalizing not only
opposition, but dissent to any degree. For example, in 1954 Nasser ordered a worker strike at a
large textile plant near Alexandria to be put down and executed its leaders.195 The regime
enforced the illusion of a liberated Egypt, while at once suffocating the tenants of democracy.
To galvanize support, Nasser formed a new Egyptian nationalist identity in pan-Arabism.
He did this in the preliminary period of the regime with “the establishment of pan-Arab media,
such as the influential radio station Sawt al-’Arab,” which was broadcast not only in Egypt, but
across the Middle East.196 In the era of a transforming world order which introduced increased
hostility between Western powers and the Middle East, pan-Arabism had “popular resonance.”197
A state-sponsored publication, The Egyptian Revolution in Three Years, recognized the potential
of pan-Arabism to transform the basis of nation-building in the Middle East. The Revolution
aimed “to disseminate joint Arab heritage so that the Arabs [could] build a united front.”198 In
this sense, identity politics came to play a large role in the legitimization of the Nasserist regime.
Abou-El-Fadl writes that, “Egyptian students were coached in al-mawad al-qawmiyya, or Arab
National Subjects, which cultivated ‘a strong sense of identification and pride with Arabism,
anti-colonialism and nationalist leaders of Nasser’s caliber.’”199
The ouster of Britain from Egypt brought an end to the global imperial system. However,
the emergence of Cold War politics transformed that system into “a more far-reaching concept,
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encompassing American defense plans and all who participated in them.”200 Egyptian activist,
author, and nurse, Nawal el-Saadawi, argues that the globalization of capitalism introduced a
“New World Order” that “in fact is an old world order which uses new methods of exploitation
and domination, both economic and intellectual.”201 The Free Officers regime recognized the
transformation of imperial designs through Cold War politics. ‘Abd al-Hamid Saud, the Egyptian
representative of Karachi, lambasted the U.S. over the conditions the American government tied
to offers of foreign aid. Saud said, “Having destroyed the shackles we suffered [...] do you
expect us to put them around our necks once again, voluntarily and by choice?”202
Nasser refused to join Egypt into any such alliance as he believed it to be “an extension
of imperialism.”203 His public defiance of Western systems through non-alignment garnered
support from the Arab world, legitimizing the Free Officer’s attempts to organize Arab identity
politics into Egyptian nationalism and propelling Nasser “into regional prominence.”204
However, Nasser’s defiance of America’s attempts to control the new world order also made him
ineligible for U.S. military support.
In 1955, Nasser concluded the Czech arms deal, which provided Egypt “$200 million
worth of advanced Soviet military equipment in exchange for Egyptian cotton.”205 The deal was
lauded by the Arab press and viewed across the Arab world as a successful assertion of
independence from Western imperial designs. In response, the U.S. withdrew a loan offer for a
massive development project, the Aswan Dam. To finance this project, Nasser instead embarked
on a program he and the Free Officers termed, “Arab Socialism.” In fact, Arab Socialism was
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less a form of Marxist socialism and “more a form of state capitalism,” not endeavored on the
basis of class conflict, but “based on the need to raise money.”206 Arab Socialism soon became
another grip of the regime’s authoritarian rule: both foreign-owned and domestic enterprises
were brought under state control, including banks, insurance companies, import agencies, and
hotels. Perhaps most dangerously, Arab Socialism predicated the seizure of the press into state
control and censorship.207
The Nasserist regime was delicately balanced on its ability to mobilize popular support
despite its strict and often violent authoritarianism. To strike this balance, the Nasserist regime
was cautious of challenging the long-standing interpersonal power structures, specifically those
formed by Egypt’s patriarchal family system. Despite providing women political
enfranchisement and new opportunities to education and work, the Nasser regime refused to take
any action which might alter the patriarchal dynamics of Egyptian private life.
Women and State Feminism in Nasser’s Egypt
Since the Nasser regime claimed sole authority over social reform, independent feminist
movements were co-opted by the government into what professor and author Mervat Hatem
describes as “state feminism.”208 While women were agents of new opportunities to political
enfranchisement, education, and work, independent feminist voices were forcefully silenced with
imprisonment. The 1956 revolutionary constitution provided women the right to vote and equal
opportunities to education and work by banning gender-based discrimination.209 Yet these gains
for women were not granted due to a female-inclusive ideology among the all-male military
bureaucrats of the Nasser regime. In 1954, for example, the Constitutional Assembly convened
206
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without female representation.210 Arguably, women’s suffrage was provided out of political
expediency to generate popular support. In fact, women’s political enfranchisement was obliged
only after rumors that the 1956 constitution would not provide women’s suffrage sparked
protests from even moderate women.211
New educational and economic opportunities for women were viewed as a “means of
achieving economic modernization and nation building.”212 Thus, while the reforms during
Nasser’s era of state-feminism accorded new rights to women in the public sphere, the
entrenchment of patriarchy in the private sphere remained an assumption of the Free Officers.
This meant that the effects of these reforms were relatively shallow for women.
Political Enfranchisement
Even though women were provided the right to vote and to hold political office,
“Feminists were neither brought into decision-making positions nor consulted about the needs of
female constituents.”213 Precisely because the Free Officers elevated to power through the old,
patriarchal, military-elite system, women were excluded from the inner circle of the Nasser
regime. Men continued to retain power and exclusively reserved for themselves the role of
arbitrating social and political roles for women. Women’s suffrage was diluted by “stipulating
that though men were required to register, it was optional for women.”214 This meant that fathers
and husbands could prevent their daughters and wives from registering. For this reason, voting
among women progressed slowly. In 1957, for example, 5.5 million men registered to vote while
210
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only 144,000 women registered. By 1965, that number among women had less-than-doubled to a
mere 250,000.215 Furthermore, women were forced to petition the state to register, which further
disenfranchised poor women, many of whom were illiterate.216
The freshly gained right to hold political office might have been an opportunity for
feminists to continue legislating new rights and reforms, particularly in matters of family law. In
fact, two women were elected to office in the first elections to the National Assembly in 1957. 217
However, the Nasser regime required any candidates to be vetted by the Liberation Rally. 218 This
meant that any women who challenged the Nasserist regime could be barred from running. For
both male and female candidates, those who “prevailed at the polls [did so] not because their
ideas appealed to voters, but rather because the state boosted them to victory.”219
When Nasser and the Free Officers banned political parties in Egypt, feminists who had
spent the better part of the twentieth century building a female identity in political activism were
caught in the crosshairs. Nasser banned feminist magazine Bint al-Nil (Daughters of the Nile) in
1953.220 The EFU was forced to abdicate its political activist roots and reorganized as a social
welfare organization under the name of the Huda Shaarawi Association.221 Outspoken feminists
were necessarily ostracized. For example, Saiza Nabarawi, who helped form the EFU, was
vocally “critical of the authoritarian tendencies of the military leaders.”222 Feminists of the time
were left with the options of either endorsing the Nasser regime, remaining silent, or vocalizing
their dissent and, therefore, making themselves the targets of Nasser’s tyranny. Thus, Nabarawi’s
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fellow feminists removed her from membership. In this way, Nasser’s tyranny often made
women “complicit in their own” oppression.223
The insight feminists held regarding the intersection that poverty created led to the
persecution of feminists who argued against the requirement of women to petition the state to
register to vote. The name of Bint al-Nil’s founder, Durriyyah Shafiq, was banned from print and
she was placed under house arrest in 1960 until her death in 1975.224 Even national feminists
who mobilized to support the regime were excluded from political activism. For example, a
group of feminists organized to provide women paramilitary training during the British invasion
of the Suez Canal zone in 1956, but the Nasser regime shut the operation down.225
Nasser broke with Egyptian tradition and took to jailing female activists. Zainab alGhazali, who headed the Muslim Women’s Society, was arrested in 1965.226 In her own
testimonies, al-Ghazali recalled incidents where prison guards attempted to rape her. In one case,
she bit “the neck of one her attackers until he died.”227 Nasser and the Free Officers recognized
the probability that such a break with tradition would be contentious and censored journalists
from reporting the arrests.228 Furthermore, women who were arrested were refused rights to
visitation by their family in order to prevent them from politicizing their family members.229
The inability of feminists to voice dissenting views against the Nasser regime marked a
backward step from the liberal-age of the monarchy, despite women’s enfranchisement. In the
liberal-age, women were remarkable actors in Egyptian national politics. Under Nasser, that role
was reserved exclusively for the all-male military bureaucrats. With the all-male bureaucratic
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regime retaining sole claim over this role, their patriarchal assumptions became embedded in
Egyptian identity politics. Patriarchy was no longer a question of confession or class, but a staple
to what it meant to be Egyptian. These patriarchal assumptions were observable not only in the
private sphere of the family, but in the public sphere where women had new rights to
participation through work and education.
Work and Education
While women made considerable gains in education and work, Nasser’s choice to create
greater access or women was entirely economic, rather than a commitment to women’s rights.230
Women’s gains were thus curtailed by patriarchal assumptions held by Nasser and the Free
Officers. The Egyptian government passed a labor code in 1959 which provided paid maternity
leave, paid breaks for new mothers, restrictions against firing expecting or new mothers, and
required any company employing over one hundred women to provide child care.231 These
reforms were remarkable considering some Western states have yet to achieve similar standards
even presently. However, the emphasis Nasser made on channeling women into “feminine jobs,”
such as teaching and clerical positions, maintained gendered division in the workplace.232
Positions in the judiciary, in diplomatic relations, and management at the Ministry of Agriculture
were reserved for men exclusively.233
Bier argues that “the prime beneficiaries of state efforts to increase the size of the female
labor force were educated middle-class women” since the bulk of new employment opportunities
resulted out of state-building endeavors.234 New positions as teachers, doctors, nurses,
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pharmacists, civil servants, and social workers all required higher education, which still
primarily middle and upper-class women pursued. For this reason, despite state efforts to draw
more women into the workforce, “by 1969, women still composed only about one tenth of the
formal wage labor market.”235 Bier writes that information regarding increases in employment
for working-class women proves inadequate as many female agricultural workers weren’t
included in state-ran data collections because their agricultural work was often considered
housework, rather than real employment.236 This view was further entrenched in legislation
which provided for unequal pay to female agricultural workers on the basis that their work was
less valuable than that of male agricultural workers.237
The patriarchal assumptions made by the Nasser regime were observable through the
emergence of gendered narratives regarding female employment. Issues of modesty and etiquette
in the workplace, how to negotiate relations with male coworkers and superiors, and even how
women should decorate their office became topics of debate in state-ran newspapers and
magazines.238 Furthermore, the preservation of patriarchal power within the family left femaleworkers with the additional challenge of juggling their familial obligations with their new
obligations to the state as economic participants. For example, without reform to male roles
within the family, female workers were expected to continue burdening the responsibility of
child care alone. Attempts to address this matter were made with the passage of the labor code
which required businesses with over one hundred female employees to run day care centers.
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However, to skirt around this law, many businesses kept their number of female employees just
under the ordinance level.239
Educational reforms became a centerpiece to the Nasserist modernization program. Not
only was primary education made compulsory for both boys and girls, but education was made
tuition free at all levels.240 By 1960, school enrollment among girls and women rose to 56
percent, almost 20 percentage points higher than the 1953 figures.241 During the Nasser
administration “female enrollment in general secondary education increased by an astonishing
631 percent” while “the female population at the university level climbed six-fold.”242 However,
even in education, the patriarchal assumptions made by the Nasser leadership could be observed.
Women were encouraged to enter educational programs that agreed with gendered norms.
Clerical education among women rose 1,750 percent between 1953 and 1971.243 Thus, “while
government provided various training opportunities and work experiences unavailable before this
time, its emphasis on secretarial posts for women betrayed the traditional attitudes of the military
leaders.”244
Overall, women made remarkable gains in the public sphere through education and
employment. This has led many women to claim that the Nasser period was one of the greatest
periods for women’s liberation in Egypt.245 However, because the all-male military leadership
monopolized state power, women still lacked any agency to decide the terms of their liberation
for themselves. The Nasser regime lacked any real conviction to reform the patriarchal nature of
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the private sphere, so women’s dependence on men continued despite advances made for them
by the state in the public sphere.246
Family Law
In the private sphere, patriarchal systems were legally enshrined through family law.
These systems were assumed inherent to national identity by the Nasserist regime as is evident
from the National Charter of 1961, which replaced the 1956 constitution when Egypt and Syria
were briefly unified. Article 18 legitimized the patriarchal assumptions of the Free Officers by
declaring “that the state was to secure, in accordance with the law, the support of the family and
the protection of mothering (al-ummuma) and childhood (al-tufula).”247 Furthermore, the charter
described the family as the “first cell of society” and asserted its claim over protecting this cell in
order to “preserve the national tradition and to reproduce its social fabric.”248 This made the
family and its patriarchal structure not only a matter of state interest, but a matter of state
regulation. The Egyptian state’s resolution to reproduce the “social fabric” of the patriarchal
family was a move intended to ingratiate itself with the Egyptian public at large. Providing
women new opportunities to education and work was economically necessary; maintaining the
patriarchal male order Egyptian society had been built around for centuries, however, was
politically necessary.
During this period, Nasser brought the various confessional family courts into a unified
system of state courts. Already, the oppressive patriarchal systems within the family instituted by
personal status laws were identifiable across confession in Egypt.249 Naturally, the unification of
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confessional courts was protested by the various religious orders who felt their autonomy and
authority over their respective communities was at threat. Bier writes that Nasser’s solution was
to “[privilege] the rights of confessional communities to have their family matters adjudicated by
their own laws,” rather than reform the laws into a universal code.250 When state courts began
adjudicating family law without reforming it, the patriarchal hierarchy apparent across
confession was sanctioned by the Egyptian state. This meant that women’s oppression within the
family was no longer a tradition according to religion or class, but a tradition according to Egypt
itself. Thus, the patriarchal family system was securely embedded into Egyptian identity politics.
When Egypt and Syria unified in 1961, Nasser formed a committee to establish universal
personal status laws within the vision of Arab Socialism. Still, no serious reforms were made
until 1979.251 Compulsory enforcement of bayt al ta’a was ended by executive order by the
Minister of Justice in 1967. However, it was not removed from family law, but amended. Family
law instead dictated that a woman deemed disobedient by the state courts forfeited entitlement to
financial support by her husband.252 The committee formed under the Nasser administration
refused to restrict divorce filed by men in order to protect “family secrets” from public
scrutiny.253 Bier concludes that family law was never seriously reformed because “the vision of
marriage contained within the personal status laws was eminently compatible with the model of
family” assumed by the state.254
Hatem critiques the theory that feminist struggles in the developing world take an
“economic survival” framework by pointing to the Nasserist period of Egyptian society. She
argues that, “To assume that the fight against underdevelopment is also a fight against gender
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inequality simplifies the complexity of patriarchal domination and its capacity to adapt to new
conditions.”255 Instead, Hatem writes that the status of women ought to be evaluated from gender
definitions and rights. The acceptance by some that the Nasserist era was a golden age for
Egyptian women evaluates women’s status on a solely economic basis. In fact, the Nasserist
state’s view that the government needed to replicate the patriarchal structure of the family
embedded gender inequality into Egyptian nationalist identity.
This eventually proved dangerous for women. Hatem writes that this led many Egyptians
to consider feminism and gender equality a symbol of “Western domination.”256 For example,
Munira Husni, argued that restricting male divorce was a mark of “European secularism,” and an
affront to the Egyptian national identity.257 Furthermore, it left gendered definitions of roles and
rights unaltered. This causes Hatem to argue that Egyptian observers should not have been
surprised when, eventually, women were called to leave public employment after Egypt’s
economy failed to improve.258
Botman points to Catherine MacKinnon who argues that, “The law treats women the way
men see and behave toward women.”259 Reversely, the state can change the way men see and
behave toward women through law if women’s liberation is a true conviction. For the Nasserist
state, it wasn’t. While nationalist men may have viewed women as agents of modernization,
“women continued to be treated as subordinates because the regime did not address personal
status law or family relations.”260
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Inevitably, Nasser’s authoritarian grip induced the ire of Egyptian society. When
Nasser’s military experienced devastating losses to the Israeli army in 1967, reactionary,
conservative forces gained traction. These forces declared opposition against all of Nasser’s
policies, including the few advances that were provided to women such as suffrage, education,
and work. The entrenchment of women’s oppression and patriarchal power in Egyptian national
identity politics deepened as the reactionary conservatives sought a return to tradition. Feminist
organizations and political activism had been effectively dismantled over the course of the
Nasser regime, leaving them with little ability to mobilize against the reactionary conservatives
who aimed to reverse the progress women had achieved over the decades.
Egypt Under Sadat and Mubarak
When Nasser died in 1970, Vice President Anwar Sadat assumed power. The turbulent
political climate surrounding Nasser’s death could have presented a power struggle in Egypt.
However, Sadat inherited the presidency for two reasons: first, Sadat galvanized the energy of
the conservative forces who opposed Nasser in order to vanquish his left-wing political rivals; 261
second, he commanded an intensive security apparatus that the U.S. described in 1969 as
reaching “into almost every corner of Egyptian society.”262 Similarly, Hosni Mubarak came into
power in 1981 after serving as Vice President under Sadat. The circumstances of Mubarak’s rise
were no different. A reactionary, conservative uprising in response to economic deterioration and
increasingly violent political repression undermined the Sadat regime. Except, this time the
uprising resulted in Sadat’s assassination.
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Both Sadat and Mubarak compounded upon the violent repression of Nasser’s
government. The period of intensified authoritarianism in Egyptian history under Sadat and
Mubarak can be attributed to the emerging hegemony of the United States and capitalism during
the last chapter of the Cold War. The police state and the military forces of the Sadat and
Mubarak regimes were both underpinned by American foreign aid. In return for the aid, Sadat
and Mubarak were expected to fulfill their end in the American agenda for the Middle East. The
United States not only expressly recognized the violent repression both Sadat and Mubarak
exercised, but explicitly exploited it.
Cleveland writes that, “The three pillars of U.S. cold war policy toward the Middle East
since the 1950s had been assuring the security and prosperity of Israel, containing Soviet
ambitions, and securing access to the petroleum resources of the oil-producing states.”263
Nasser’s policy of non-alignment coupled with his determination to lead the cause against Israel
put a drain on the Egyptian economy. When Sadat entered power, he was mounted with a $2
billion deficit and a foreign debt that outsized Egypt’s gross domestic product.264 Ending the war
was economically necessary for the new regime. However, conceding to Israel would put Sadat’s
already fragile position at risk. Furthermore, Israel would not ratify any peace treaty desirable to
Egypt. If Sadat wanted leverage in the conflict, befriending the U.S. was his only hope.
Sadat made an about-face and “expelled 20,000 Soviet military advisers.”265 Sadat then
conspired to force a military stalemate that would require the superpowers to intervene with what
would be remembered as the October War. Despite expelling Soviet military advisors, Sadat
continued to receive Soviet weaponry throughout the war, while America supplied Israel. 266 A
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ceasefire was declared by the superpowers only after losses amounted to over 13,700 soldiers on
either side.267 Furthermore, the conflict made a third world war appear imminent when Israeli
forces attacked a Soviet merchant ship off the coast of Syria. Soviet warships dispatched to the
Mediterranean and were authorized to open fire on Israeli combatants. The carnage made clear
one ominous revelation: that both the Soviets and the U.S. were willing to engage directly.268
The realization made an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement more imperative than ever.
After Egypt complied with the U.S.-Soviet brokered ceasefire, then-President Nixon
appropriated to Egypt $250 million in economic assistance.269 The aid came with conditions, but
it nevertheless initiated a new era of U.S.-Egyptian relations. Following receipt of the
endowment, Sadat announced the political and economic liberalization of Egypt. He reversed
Nasser’s policy of Arab Socialism, “stripped away state intervention, provided major tax
exemptions for foreign companies, and lifted the requirement that foreign companies be partly
Egyptian-owned.”270 This was a welcomed win for the U.S. who led the capitalist alliance in the
Cold War. Consequently, the U.S. ended its arms-embargo against Egypt and American aid
inflated to over $1 billion annually.271
However, the promise of political liberalization was empty. From its inception in 1971,
the Sadat regime was heavy-handed against opposition. Sadat purged left-wing political rivals
from government.272 In order to ingratiate himself with the Egyptian public, Sadat instead
appealed to the conservatives who opposed Nasser.273 For example, Sadat released conservative

267

Cleveland, 364.
Cleveland, 366.
269
Brownlee, 648.
270
Brownlee, 649.
271
Brownlee, 649.
272
Cleveland, 346.
273
Hatem, “The Enduring Alliance,” 32; Botman, 75.
268

59

political prisoners who were arrested during Nasser’s regime.274 The privatization of the
Egyptian economy under Sadat, or infitah, precipitated greater political turbulence. The inflation
rate soon rose to over 20 percent,275 while Egyptian exports declined.276 In 1975, worker strikes
spread across Egypt, beginning in Cairo until “40,000 laborers in the industrial town of Mahalla
went on strike.”277 Sadat’s police state responded with machine guns.
The new policy of infitah made Egypt eligible for international aid from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the IMF’s economic aid became a further extension of the
neocolonial, capitalist world order. For Egypt particularly, IMF aid was a channel for Western
influence in Egyptian policy. For example, in 1977 the IMF informed Sadat that Egypt would not
qualify for new loans until they were divested from state welfare and invested in “more
productive areas.”278 Under Mubarak, the IMF continually pressured the Egyptian state to
privatize public sectors, an action that was logistically infeasible given the Egyptian people’s
heavy reliance on government employment.279 In exchange for aiding the U.S. in the 1991 Gulf
War, the IMF cut Egypt’s accumulated debt in half.280
Sadat adhered to the IMF’s warnings. His “decision to retrench subsidies, rather than
curb military spending, debt servicing, or investment, reflected the government’s priorities about
placating domestic and foreign elites.”281 Inevitably, nationwide riots once again spread. At one

274

Botman, 75.
Cleveland, 368.
276
Brownlee, 650.
277
Brownlee, 650.
278
Cleveland, 368.
279
Cleveland, 382.
280 Lothe, Anders Toft, “Integrity Starts At Home: The International Monetary Fund and the promotion of good
governance policies in Egypt between 1996 and 2011,” University of Bergen, 2016, 14. For more on the use of the
IMF as a U.S. foreign policy vehicle, see: Momani, Bessma, “American politicization of the International Monetary
Fund,” in Review of International Political Economy, 11:4, 2004, 880-904.
281
Brownlee, 651.
275

60

point, protestors reached upwards of 30,000 in Cairo.282 Sadat’s security forces eventually
quelled the demonstrations, but in so doing arrested between 1,200 and 2,000 Egyptians.283 If the
protests didn’t irrevocably reverse Egypt’s trajectory towards liberalization, they certainly
cemented Egypt’s path towards greater authoritarianism than the country had witnessed ever
before. The following day, Sadat took to state-broadcast to propagandize the protests as being the
work of Soviet agents. He then promised that from then on, strikes and demonstrations would be
criminalized.284 Such a promise necessitated a dramatic increase in internal security forces,
which prompted Sadat to further entrench the Egyptian state in the U.S.-led capitalist alliance
with $750 million in military aid.285
By alienating his government from the Egyptian people and simultaneously increasing
his dependence on U.S. foreign aid, Sadat undermined his diplomatic position. Towards the end
of the 1970s, the United States political agenda in the Middle East focused on obtaining a peace
agreement between Egypt and Israel. First and foremost, this was due to the U.S.’s operation to
gain hegemony in the Middle East. A peace agreement between Egypt and Israel had the
potential to completely undo the Soviet strategy. Furthermore, presidential re-elections loomed
for then President Jimmy Carter in 1980.286 At one point, Carter went as far as warning the Sadat
that not reaching a peace agreement would cost him his job.287
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Carter pressured Sadat to compromise on a number of issues by threatening to withdraw
U.S. foreign aid to Egypt.288 Sadat informed his delegation that he would agree to any proposal
made by President Carter at all.289 Carter relied on Sadat’s heavy hand to force any concessions
made in the treaty through Egypt. In his own autobiography, Carter wrote that, “It was obvious
that under strong leadership, the opinion of the Egyptians could be changed.”290 Sadat and Carter
met to discuss a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel just months after Sadat’s security forces
had violently repressed nationwide riots. The same month a peace treaty was reached, the State
Department awarded U.S. company Jonas Aircraft and Arms a license to sell the Egyptian
government 100,000 tear and pepper gas grenades.291 Their use on Egyptians was inevitable. The
U.S. not only exploited Sadat’s violent repression of the Egyptian people but enabled,
encouraged, and relied on it as a political strategy.
Following the ratification of the peace treaty, Egypt received an annual aid package of
approximately $1 billion from the U.S. government.292 Consequently, Egypt was expelled from
the Arab League and lost subsidies from the oil-producing states in the Middle East.293
Effectively, Egypt’s economic dependence on the U.S. deepened, which enabled the U.S. to bend
Egypt to its will. Critics pointed out that “the specific projects funded by U.S. economic
assistance and the methods by which they were selected” made it appear “that U.S. priorities, not
Egyptian ones, were driving Egypt’s development strategy.”294 Western nations no longer
required direct imperialism to force their interests through foreign nations. Providing military
and economic aid to dictators who would otherwise be overthrown was effective enough.
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This transformation of foreign influence had dire consequences for Egyptians who
demanded political freedom. When members of the Egyptian parliament objected to the peace
treaty, Sadat disbanded parliament and called for new elections. Only two of the former
parliament members who objected to the treaty were reelected, including Mumtaz Nasr, “whose
supporters brandished submachine guns and forced the police to count ballots on the spot.”295
Thanks to the neocolonial capitalism world order, any vestige of democracy in Egypt necessarily
turned militant. Sadat also increased levels of surveillance and by the end of his run in office he
had imprisoned over 1,500 activists, including women’s liberation advocate Nawal elSaadawi.296 When Sadat first came to power, he rejected Nasser’s secularism and galvanized
conservative religious fervor to undermine the appeal of Nasser’s socialist policies.297 Over time,
opposition from religious groups increased, which led Sadat to reverse course and arrest Islamic
activists. A brother of an arrested activist assassinated Sadat in 1981, giving rise to Mubarak.298
Mubarak’s run as president of Egypt produced nothing remarkably different from Sadat’s
regime. Instead, Mubarak’s government seemed content with preserving the status quo. Mubarak
lacked any political agenda or ideology, other than “to stay in power.”299 During his reign in the
1980s, U.S. aid totaled $2.2 billion annually.300 Briefly, in the elections of 1984, Mubarak
allowed “the appearance of a new era of political freedom” by permitting the Wafd Party to run
in the elections.301 However, when the Wafd party gained control of parliament in those
elections, Mubarak reversed this liberalization and recommitted the Egyptian state to despotism.
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At the same time, capitalism was systematically failing the Egyptian people and U.S.
assistance failed to alleviate the country’s financial situation and, in fact, dramatically increased
economic disparity. Cleveland writes, “Those who did profit from the economic liberalization,
many of whom were the president’s friends and relatives, engaged in ostentatious displays of
wealth that only served to remind the majority of Egyptians how unsatisfactory their own
circumstances were.”302 The globalization of gross economic disparity resulted out of the
globalization of capitalism by the neocolonial world order. Its symptoms would not be contained
to Egypt alone. Mubarak’s regime was forced to abdicate in 2011 by the Arab Spring, a
revolutionary uprising that arguably inspired the Occupy encampments that same year.
Women Under Sadat and Mubarak
Women suffered drastically under the economic deterioration and political repression of
the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. Sadat dealt a grave blow to women by manipulating reactionary
social conservatism to his advantage prior to repealing Nasser’s socialist reforms. The failure of
Nasser’s government to resolve Egypt’s economy and position in world politics beckoned a call
to revive cultural authenticity.303 In her essay, “Women and the Poor: The Challenges to Global
Justice,” el-Saadawi explains the emergence of reactionary conservativism in the face of
globalization:
“The globalization needed by the international capitalist system leads people in different
countries or cultures to resist homogenization resulting from the global culture, or so-called
universal values. It is a self-defence mechanism. It is an attempt to hold on to an authentic
identity, or authentic culture or heritage, and these are some of the factors in the growth of
religious fundamentalism, racism and ethnic struggles. It is a protest movement (especially
among the youth), but very often takes on reactionary, retrograde, anti-women and antiprogressive characteristics, leading to division and discord; it thus serves the purpose of capitalist
globalization because it divides the people who are resisting it.”304
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For social conservatives, cultural authenticity included the older generation’s framework
for women’s citizenship that Nasser altered by opening public sector employment to women.
Sadat attempted to assimilate these social conservatives into his cadre of supporters by the
passage of a new constitution in 1971. The constitution pledged that the family was a unit shaped
by national values and that the state would “preserve this genuine character of the Egyptian
family” by supporting for women’s work only when it did not interfere with the family.305 This
effectively vested the patriarchal male order instituted in government, in private business
enterprises, and in the family with the renewed power to “dislodge women from their previous
gains.”306Patriarchists asserted that in a stagnating economy, women were obligated to return
home and relinquish their positions to men.307
Sadat’s economic policies quickly resulted in increasing wealth gaps between the poor
and the bureaucratic elite. The structural adjustment policies of the IMF not only included
reducing government spending in order to favor debt repayments, but privatizing trade, reducing
barriers to foreign investment such as tariffs and import duties, and increasing interest rates
which, in turn, reduced the ability of Egyptians to obtain credit.308 While the wider Egyptian
population struggled to find employment, went hungry, and lost access to important services
such as medical care, the elite under Sadat’s rule flourished. Displays of wealth only augmented
the resentment and frustration of Egypt at-large. In fact, Sadat’s own displays of wealth became
so obtuse that Egyptians called him “Faruq II.”309
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Thus, the new class of Egyptian wealthy became “symbols of a new wave of Western
cultural and economic domination.”310 El-Saadawi echoes this view: “Development is just
another word for neocolonialism.”311 The structural adjustments Sadat pursued under the
influence of the US and the IMF impacted women the hardest. As the state cut its contributions
to services for Egyptians, “women, who were heavily dependent on the state for employment and
services, found fewer opportunities in the paid labor force and faced a truncated social welfare
network.”312 Lack of new job opportunities meant greater competition for work, which caused
women’s employment to come under fire. The social tensions created by such economic pressure
resulted in an increase of women’s harassment.313 Yet the structural adjustments made in Egypt
dramatically raised living costs and inflation, which meant women couldn’t afford to forfeit their
jobs. Furthermore, the political repression asserted by Sadat left working-class Egyptians little
recourse to improve their lots democratically.
The hard-hitting economic consequences felt by women due to Sadat’s capitalist policies
caused anti-capitalism to become a central part of Egyptian feminist politics. Anti-capitalism is
such a prominent factor in the politics of el-Saadawi, that she even cautions against terming
herself a “feminist,” precisely because the language of feminism was created by the capitalist
West. In Egypt, to be a feminist is to be anti-capitalist and anti-colonialist, as well as antipatriarchist. The politics of the capitalist world order at once purport to support freedom and
democracy, but “but whose agreements and decisions lead to the opposite—that is, to war,
poverty, inequality and dictatorship.”314 Women are most impacted by the economic inequalities
initiated by capitalism. Between the 1970s and 1980s, poverty among women in the world rose
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by fifty percent and, even though women worked two-thirds of the total labor hours recorded by
UN figures, they earned only “one-tenth of total world income.”315 For that reason, el-Saadawi
argues that inherent to global gender justice is the reorganization of “a new world order based
on justice.”316 El-Saadawi’s positions on economic justice would be rearticulated by both the
Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011, as well as the Occupy Wall Street movements that same year.
When social conservatives turned on Sadat, he attempted to reverse course with respect to
women and women’s rights. Sadat broke Egyptian tradition and inserted the Egyptian state into
the private sphere of the patriarchal family by reforming Egypt’s personal status codes. The new
laws regulated polygamy by allowing wives to divorce their husbands if they did not agree to the
polygamous arrangement, while ensuring that a divorced mother would not be penalized for
doing so by being evicted from her home.317 However, because the reforms were passed through
an executive decree, both conservatives and feminists protested the authoritarian hand with
which the laws were instituted.318
Following Sadat’s assassination, the High Constitutional Court determined the laws to be
unconstitutional on the grounds that executive decrees could be issued only in states of
emergency.319 Similarly, Sadat issued another executive decree in 1979 which reserved thirty
seats in the Egyptian parliament for women and stipulated that “10 to 20 percent of the seats in
the twenty-six government councils around the country be signed to women.”320 Once again,
while the policy might have been something that earlier feminists would have endorsed, they
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could not accept his authoritarian style.321 When Sadat’s reforms failed to win over Egyptian
women and, instead, stirred even more, his regime passed the “Law of Shame.” Purportedly, the
law was designed to protect Egyptian values. In reality, it was used to imprison opponents before
a special court without ability to appeal the verdict of the court.322 Both liberal and conservative
women alike, including el-Saadawi, were imprisoned under the Law of Shame.323
Mubarak’s rise to power continued the Sadat regime’s authoritarianism through the
implementation of the Law of Shame while simultaneously appeasing ultra-conservatives by
repealing the reforms Sadat passed to advance women’s status. The Arab Women’s Solidarity
Association (AWSA) produced a journal titled Nun and wrote about a range of controversial
subjects such as family life, marriage, female circumcision, and poverty. The Mubarak regime
eventually forced the journal to stop publication. The next year, after the AWSA spoke out
against Mubarak’s support of the Gulf War, the regime forced the AWSA to disband altogether
using Sadat’s Law of Shame.324 In 1986, Mubarak replaced Sadat’s 1979 representation quotas
with a law that provided for each “geographic constituency” a single seat “to an independent
candidate, without regard to gender.”325 As a result of Mubarak’s abolishment of the quota
system, only 10 women held office in Egyptian parliament by 1990, and only 7 of those had been
elected while 3 were appointed.326
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The decades under Sadat and Mubarak were difficult and divisive for all of Egypt, but
especially for women. Egyptians who challenged the regime at all were silenced and Egyptian
women who challenged the regime on feminist grounds were silenced by both the regimes, and
patriarchists. However, one interesting development occurred during these regimes: with a
globalized marketplace, came globalized information. The Egyptian women’s press harnessed
this development by bringing international awareness to women’s plight in Egypt. For example,
Nun published articles about “the exploitation of poor women and minor girls who were being
married to affluent men from Arab oil-producing countries through paid business agents.”327 In
response, the Egyptian government passed laws regulating these types of arrangements.328
Additionally, when the Sadat government began to incarcerate outspoken feminists, globalized
access to that information precipitated international letter writing campaigns to support the
release of women political prisoners.329
The international attention Egypt drew for its treatment of women escalated under
Mubarak. At the behest of several international NGOs, Mubarak’s regime adopted a so-called
“gender agenda.”330 For example, in 2009, the Egyptian People’s Assembly passed a law which
created 64 new seats reserved for women. However, a lack of free and open democracy meant
that those seats were filled by women affiliated with Mubarak’s ruling party, so that “increased
women’s representation served the interests of the regime.”331 Though important family laws
were reformed, such as establishing a minimum marriage age of 18 and criminalizing female
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genital mutilation,332 their passage through the Mubarak government provided the appearance
that feminism was complicit in the violent political repression of the regime.
These NGOs failed to challenge altogether Mubarak’s repressive government and the
international financing organizations which kept him in power. By ignoring this global
intersection, and instead focusing on women’s rights alone, the international women’s
community in fact increased backlash against women in Egypt. Professor Marzi Tadros writes,
“Authoritarianism is not necessarily inimical to women’s rights, as long as these rights do not
challenge the power base of the status quo in fundamental ways.” Rather than improving the lot
of Egyptian women, international NGOs legitimized Mubarak’s attempts to paint his regime as
one “committed to democracy.”333
Regardless, Egyptian feminists demonstrated an admirable prescience of the world’s
course once more. Under Sadat and Mubarak, Egyptian feminists harnessed the power of
globalized information to communicate their cause to empathetic audiences around the world.
El-Saadawi articulated this feminist prescience in her essay that was published in the mid-1990s:
“We need unity and solidarity between men and women who resist this global injustice at the
local level as well as at the international level. But we need a movement that is progressive, not
backward, which seeks unity in diversity [...] This requires establishing a network step by step
from the local up to the global level to face the international capitalist network. We can use
modern technology such as videos, cassettes, public radio, television, and so on.”334
The Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements met el-Saadawi’s call to action and
mobilized the social assets of modern technology in a revolutionary uprising that swept the world
over in 2011.
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The 2011 Arab Spring and Beyond
Mubarak was forced to abdicate power in 2011 by a popular uprising known as the Arab
Spring. Opposition to Mubarak mounted for three decades prior to the mass demonstrations. The
impact of structural adjustments in Egypt caused rampant unemployment, with youth
unemployment hitting 25 percent by 2009.335 The withdrawal of the Egyptian state from funding
needed services such as health-care and food subsidies simultaneously placed a higher burden on
families who had less resources to draw from.336 In order to stifle dissent, the Mubarak regime
weaponized the Egyptian bureaucracy in order to rescind or refuse permits to universities,
mosques, and media outlets for expressing political views that ran counter to the state.337
Elections under Mubarak were characteristically fraudulent and marred by corruption. In 2005,
the Egyptian state refused to accept ballot counts which gave a Brotherhood-affiliated candidate
a seat in parliament and instead awarded the seat to the candidate’s rival. Consequently, riot
police tear-gassed hundreds of protesters.338
The economic duress and divisive political climate came to a head when a 28-year old
Egyptian man was beaten to death by police after “he had taken pictures of them sharing the
spoils of a drug bust.”339 Outrage spread when a video of the man’s body revealed that the police
had fabricated their report that he died from ingesting drugs. On January 25, 2011, Egyptians
took to Tahrir Square to demand Mubarak’s resignation, free and fair elections, and the creation
of a new Egyptian constitution. Mubarak abdicated his power promptly, less than three weeks
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after the protests began. However, Mubarak’s resignation was forced by the Egyptian military as
a strategy to preserve its power.340 The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces stepped in as
the interim leader of Egypt until free elections could be held.
In her comparative essay on the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street protests, Hatem
illustrates the ways in which the neoliberal economic policies of the capitalist world order led to
mass demonstrations around the world. The strategic adjustments instituted in Egypt by the IMF
were modeled after the same policies that Ronald Reagan initiated in the US and Margaret
Thatcher initiated in the UK.341 The same policies of reducing welfare and deregulating the
economy that eroded Egypt’s economy, led to the massive redistribution of wealth from working
and middle-class families to the top 1 percent in America—a major point of contention for the
Occupy movement that was articulated in its slogan, “We Are the 99%.”342
Like Mubarak, who used the threat of political Islam to transform Egypt into a national
security state, the Bush Jr. administration used the so-called war on terror to transform the US
into a national security state and provide new legal and extra-legal powers to the executive
branch.343 This included “new unmonitored powers given to law enforcement agencies [...]
including the large-scale surveillance of groups engaged in dissenting activities like the defence
of civil liberties, environmental justice, and civil rights.”344 Hatem’s analysis provides important
insight: We live in an age of a totally globalized, capitalist world order, whose victims are no
longer contained to the “Second” and “Third World.” In fact, the citizens of the U.S., the very
nation that so aggressively installed this world order, are now experiencing the same
consequences of its capitalist policies that others around the world have experienced for decades.
340

Ottaway, Marina & Ottaway, David, “Egypt’s Durable Arab Spring,” in Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2016.
Hatem, “The Arab Spring,” 405.
342
Hatem, “The Arab Spring,” 405.
343
Hatem, “The Arab Spring,” 411-12.
344
Hatem, “The Arab Spring,” 412.
341

72

The Occupy protests began in September 2011, months after the Arab Spring. Hatem
writes that the Occupy protests utilized many of the same tactics Egyptians used in January of
the same year, such as making calls to action on social media and protesting through “peaceful
public encampment.”345 Furthermore, the police which evicted the Occupy encampments used
similar strategies that the Egyptian police used in Tahrir Square, such as “attacking the protesters
at night, suspending Internet service during the attacks, and describing the protesters of having
been infiltrated by criminal elements.”346 The Arab Spring and Occupy protests were both
demonstrations against the neocolonial, capitalist world order. That the points of contention for
both movements persist today attests to the strength with which this world order has integrated
itself with national and international governments. Hatem describes the order as “decentered and
deterritorial,” able to reproduce “key social actors and their consciousness” in nearly every
region of the world.347
The first elections held in Egypt following Mubarak’s removal elevated Brotherhoodaffiliated Mohamed Morsi to presidency in June 2012. President Morsi was considered Egypt’s
first democratically elected leader in history.348 Following the elections, Morsi and the newly
elected Egyptian parliament drafted an Egyptian constitution that was enacted in December
2012. Despite widespread concerns that a Brotherhood-affiliated candidate would negatively
impact women’s rights, the 2012 constitution was the first to unequivocally provide “equality
and equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women, without distinction, favoritism, or
partiality, in rights or duties.”349 It was the first Egyptian constitution which did not differentiate
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rights or duties of citizens between genders. Furthermore, sentiments of equal citizenship were
reiterated five times in Articles 6, 8, 9, 33, and 63, while Article 68 committed the state to take
“all measures to establish equality between women and men in political, cultural, economic and
social life and all other fields.”350
Less than a year after his election, Morsi was deposed by the Egyptian military under the
lead of the Minister of Defense, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Sisi subsequently suspended the Egyptian
Constitution of 2012 and proposed an election for a new constitution, new parliament, and a new
president.351 Popular protests spread once again, which the military responded to with the August
2013 Rabba massacre. Human Rights Watch reported that at least 817 people died in the
massacre, though it estimated the actual number to exceed 1,000 deaths, while an estimated
4,000 were injured.352 The removal of Morsi from power inaugurated a new period of greater
authoritarianism and corruption than Egypt has witnessed ever before.
The Egyptian military held elections in 2014, the results of which have been widely
disputed. The New York Times reported that international observers, like Democracy
International, called fair and democratic elections impossible in Egypt.353 That Sisi won the vote
by over 95 percent only compounded claims that his election was fraudulent. The election was
also characterized by empty polling stations and a remarkable “absence of voters.”354 Despite
this, “roughly 54 million eligible voters had cast ballots” in the 2014 election, giving Sisi 23.9
million votes compared to Morsi’s 13.2 million votes in 2012.355
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From 2013 to 2015, “at least 1,800 civilians and 700 security personnel [had] been killed,
tens of thousands [had] been imprisoned, and severe restrictions [had] been placed on media,
civil society, and protest activity.”356 As the five year anniversary of the Arab Spring approached
in 2016, the Egyptian military forcibly searched over 5,000 civilian homes, cracked down on
Facebook by blocking access to nearly 3 million Egyptians, and took advantage of the state’s
control of religious institutions to instruct that all imams warn Egyptian mosque-goers that
participating in demonstrations violated Islamic law.357
Sisi is up for reelection in 2018. In preparation, the Sisi regime has passed legislation
which restricts the ability of human rights organizations to conduct aid within the state.358
Despite objections from the international community, Sisi has been “emboldened by a
burgeoning friendship with President Trump, who has [...] indicated that he did not intend to
allow human rights issues to sour their relationship.”359 Consequently, Sisi passed the aid
restrictions and has continued to ramp up censorship of news media in Egypt. Trump’s
willingness to overlook Sisi’s violence, however, is not new. Under the Obama administration,
the US continued to provide military aid to Egypt to the sum of $6.5 billion, even following
Sisi’s seize of power.360 In 2016, Sisi won a bid for a $12 billion loan from the IMF.361 The
continuing financial support by the U.S. and the IMF has perpetuated the political tyranny
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Egyptians fought against in 2011. Thus, the capitalist world order threatens to sweep the
revolutionary uprising into the dustbins of history.
Women in the Arab Spring and Beyond
In 2011, women rose against the Mubarak regime alongside their male counterparts.
Female activists like Nawara Negm played a large role in organizing the Egyptian Revolution
through online blogging and social media.362 Pockets of gendered violence were widely reported
upon by the state-ran and foreign medias to stir fear and encourage Egyptians to return home and
reinstate law and order. CNN, for example, reported on the gang rape of American journalist
Lara Logan and wrote, “One of the hallmarks of revolutionary victory in Tahrir Square has
always been rape and sexual harassment.”363 While gendered sexual violence certainly
problematized the participation of women in the revolution, narratives surrounding gendered
violence simplify the matter as an issue of religious fundamentalism. Rather than recognizing the
global intersection which produced the appearance of complicity on the part of feminism, CNN
attributed gendered violence to the Muslim Brotherhood. “Out went the nongovernmental
organizations that worked to make divorce easier and inheritance laws fairer. In came the thugs
who stripped and beat women in the streets,” it reported.364 The failure to recognize global
intersections thus not only perpetuates women’s oppression, but Islamophobia.
In fact, the activism of Egypt’s youth during and after the Arab Spring provided a new
chapter for women’s liberation. A multitude of organizations against women’s harassment and
assault proliferated in Egypt during and after the revolution. Women’s harassment and assault is
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extensive in Egypt, as it is in most places. A UN study published in 2013 discovered that 99
percent of the 2,000 girls polled had experienced either verbal or physical sexual harassment.365
One month prior to the Egyptian uprising in 2011, an organization called Harassmap formed in
order “to encourage doormen, shop owners, and others consistently on the streets to intervene if
they witnessed harassment.”366 Other groups like Basma, Didd al-Taharrush (Against
Harassment), and Shuft Taharrush (I Saw Harassment) have since formed to provide harassmentfree transportation for women, to patrol areas that have “historically facilitated harassment,” and
to assist victims of assault in seeking justice.367 This activism has been widely covered in
Egyptian media and TV talk-shows, including Misr 25, a now-canceled Muslim Brotherhood
channel.368
Anti-harassment and anti-assault activism have led to measurable progress. For example,
Cairo University adopted anti-harassment policies after its president was lambasted for
criticizing a female student’s inappropriate dress after a video of her assault went viral.369
Furthermore, the policies adopted by the university were formulated by feminist activists and
professors and included an investigatory committee composed of a female-majority.370 In 2014,
the Ministry of Health “ordered that hospital emergency rooms would admit all [survivors] and
provide them care free of charge for forty-eight hours” after activists called upon the ministry to
take action when a female survivor had been denied care.371
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Sisi’s dictatorship has left women worse off than ever before, though the 2014 Egyptian
constitution purports to provide a wealth of economic and political rights to women. Article 11,
for example, declares that the Egyptian state is responsible for securing “equality between
women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.”372 However, the idea
that any Egyptians have a shred of genuine political rights to democratic participation under
Sisi’s regime is laughable at best. Only for this reason, could one justify that women and men are
politically equal. Furthermore, Article 11 also articulates that the state must enable “women to
strike a balance between family duties and work requirements.”373 The enmeshment of the
private, patriarchal system of the family into Egyptian national identity politics remains.
With Sisi’s decision to increase restrictions on the operations of aid organizations and to
persecute the individuals involved with them, the consequences for women in Egypt will be
harsh. According to a labor study conducted in 2014, women’s unemployment in Egypt is double
that of men, which consequently makes them an especially large audience to the education, food,
and health care services provided by aid organizations.374 Worst of all, the International
Federation for Human Rights reported in 2015 that the Egyptian state has taken to using sexual
violence to diffuse opposition.375 The study alleges that members of the police, National Security
Intelligence, and the military have all taken part in sexual torture, rape, and sexual blackmail.
Sisi’s dictatorship has only multiplied crimes against human rights, democracy, and women. Yet,
despite Sisi’s escalation of political violence, he continues to receive support from the IMF and
the U.S. To be clear, Sisi’s commitment to becoming one of the most notorious dictators in
Egyptian history is made possible only by this financial support.
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Conclusion
The role of influence Western governments exercise over Egypt has transformed over the
last century, but its objectives remain the same. The use of foreign capital by Western
governments and international finance organizations to achieve their political and economic
agendas has a very real price for Egyptian people and, especially, for Egyptian women. In a
world Western hegemonic powers portray as “post-colonial,” the domination, violence, and
exploitation of the colonial world persists through the capitalist world order. This world order
continues to hold in contempt the basic humanity of people around the world, all in the name of
free market and profit. The ills of this world order are not contained to Egypt alone. Economic
inequality, political tyranny, and national discord have sowed the world over. The impacts of
these ills on people generally, but women especially, can no longer be ignored by those who
would boast themselves as feminists.
In the words of Crenshaw herself, “When one discourse fails to acknowledge the
significance of the other, the power relations that each attempts to challenge are strengthened.”376
Without understanding this global intersection, women’s rights advocates will continue to fail in
their strategies for improving the status of women around the world. In the case of Egypt,
international women’s advocates and NGOs have opted to work with dictatorships to improve
the treatment of women. Because those feminists failed to acknowledge the role of international
finance organizations and foreign powers in keeping violent authoritarians in power, they
strengthened the gendered violence and discrimination faced by Egyptian women. This is a
pattern that must be stopped if Western feminists are to make a sincere effort at cultivating
international sisterhood and solidarity.
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It’s imperative that an understanding of global intersections be integrated into the
strategies of feminists. El-Saadawi writes, “We cannot speak about global injustice without
speaking about inequality between countries, inequality between classes in each country, and
inequalities are linked together in the patriarchal capitalist system that governs the world
today.”377 The role Western governments have played in propping up repressive regimes is a
crime against human rights, and especially women’s rights. Without taking this history into
consideration, the economic disintegration and violent political repression that has hindered
Egyptian women from fully liberating themselves will only continue.
It is time for Western women to abandon not only white feminism, but imperial
feminism. They must look to feminists around the world, like el-Saadawi and her Egyptian
feminist ancestors, who can provide understanding on the transnational complexities that affect
the lives of women around the word. By doing so, feminists can find new inspiration to come
together in a truly inclusive, global movement for women’s liberation. Patriarchal systems
manifested the ideologies which justified colonization and, now, capitalism. Patriarchal systems
spread institutions vested with the object of domination and exploitation around the globe.
Patriarchal systems created the world of today—a world rampant with poverty, hunger, war,
political tyranny, and disease. It is time for all feminists to come together and forge the world of
the future, a world in which the many ills of patriarchy are answered. Though feminists may face
an uphill battle, they must persist. Globally inclusive, intersectional feminism can show the way.
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